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ARTICLES
DEFINING PATENT QUALITY
Christi J. Guerrini*
Depending on whom you ask, the state of U.S. patent quality is either
dismal or decent, in decline or on the upswing, in need of intervention or
best left alone. Absent from the ongoing debate about the quality of U.S.
patents, however, is much thoughtful discussion about what constitutes a
patent’s “quality” in the first place. What features of a patent make it
“good” in quality, what features make it “bad” in quality, and whose
opinion matters? Surprisingly, scholars and policymakers have shown little
interest in these questions. Yet their answers are critical to the direction of
the patent agenda because they dictate how to measure patent quality and,
consequently, how to evaluate the extent of the so-called patent quality
“crisis” as well as the effectiveness of quality reforms.
The broad aim of this Article is to draw attention to the definition of
patent quality as an important subject of scholarly inquiry. Its more
specific aim is to call for a return to first principles and begin the process
of operationalizing the meaning of patent quality. It does so by analyzing
the concept using a methodology applied in the business literature of
quality management. The implications of this work include a fundamentally
different approach to patent quality’s meaning that is essentially the inverse
of the conventional way of thinking about the concept. That is, instead of
defining a good-quality patent as one that, at a minimum, satisfies the
existing legal standards of patentability, the legal standards of patentability
(among other things) should be adjusted and applied to reflect good patent
quality. Following this new approach, I propose a formula for assessing
patent quality and identify the most important variable in that formula: the
quality “dimensions” along which patent quality can be said to rise and
fall. Identifying these dimensions is the necessary first step in a process
that ultimately aims to shift the focus of reform efforts from the limited goal
of increasing the number of legally valid patents toward the more relevant
goal of increasing the number of good-quality patents.

* IP Fellow, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For their comments on earlier drafts of this
Article, I wish to thank Chris Buccafusco, Ralph Clifford, Edward Lee, Phillip Page, Chris
Schmidt, David Schwartz, and participants of PatCon 3, the 2013 Works-in-Progress IP
Colloquium, the Chicago-Kent College of Law Faculty and Junior Faculty Workshops, and
the 2013 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting.
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INTRODUCTION
Depending on whom you ask, the state of U.S. patent quality is either
dismal or decent, in decline or on the upswing, in need of intervention or
best left alone.
On one side of the debate are those who believe that the universe of U.S.
patents is populated by an unacceptably high and perhaps growing number
of low-quality—or “bad”—patents.1 Generally speaking, bad patents are
1. Ronald J. Mann & Marian Underweiser, A New Look at Patent Quality: Relating
Patent Prosecution to Validity, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2012) (“No respected
observer would deny the significance of the difficulties facing the patent system or that the
central problem is the decline in the quality of patents.” (citation omitted)); R. Polk Wagner,
Understanding Patent Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2144 (2009) (noting
that “most academics likely believe that patent quality could (and should) be higher” and that
those less familiar with the patent system are convinced that the pervasiveness of low-quality
patents is a serious problem).
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bad because they carve out of the public domain and deter others from
practicing inventions that are in some way undeserving of patent protection.
In addition, some bad patents are bad because they cause those working in
related fields to unnecessarily restrict their operations or engage in
expensive licensing transactions or lawsuits to protect themselves. A less
tangible but equally worrisome consequence of bad patents is that they
undermine the integrity of the patent system, including the institutions and
professionals that sustain it.
Although the patent community has long been concerned with the
dissemination of bad patents,2 in the past several decades, activity around a
so-called “quality crisis” has intensified.3 The legal academy, practitioners,
and industry members have loudly complained about the quality of U.S.
patents,4 and even those less familiar with the patent system appear
convinced that low patent quality is a serious problem. 5 Responding to
these concerns, in the past decade, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) has identified patent quality as a pressing institutional issue and has
launched a number of initiatives intended to improve it.6 And most
2. See, e.g., 1 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS 9 (1869) [hereinafter 1869 REPORT]
(expressing concern with the seeming proliferation of patent practitioners who were “more
solicitous about the number [of patents] than the quality of those which they obtain”); 1
ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS 4 (1868) [hereinafter 1868 REPORT] (“I apprehend that
much of [the] apparent [increase in patents] has arisen from the allowance of patents that
never should have been granted.”).
3. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the
Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY
L.J. 61, 63 & n.2 (2006) (collecting articles criticizing the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
for issuing “so-called ‘bad’ or improvidently granted patents”); Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer
to Patent”: Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 123, 123 (2006) (“There is a crisis of patent quality.”); John R. Thomas, Collusion
and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 305, 321 (“The patent quality crisis is worthy of our attention.”); Aaron Homer,
Comment, Whatever It Is . . . You Can Get It on eBay . . . Unless You Want an Injunction—
How the Supreme Court and Patent Reform Are Shifting Licensing Negotiations from the
Conference Room to the Courtroom, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 235, 275 (2007) (“The assertion that
the PTO is overwhelmed, under-funded, and issuing too many low quality patents has
universal acceptance.”).
4. See supra notes 1, 3; see also Chris Mercer, Panel Contribution, in Sara-Jayne
Adams, Quality Is the Key to a Bright Patent Future, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Apr./May 2008,
at 55, 63–64 (“[T]he quality of patents issued by the USPTO has declined . . . .”); Manny W.
Schecter & Marian Underweiser, Panel Contribution, in Adams, supra, at 55, 65 (“IBM
believes that patent quality has suffered in recent years . . . .”).
5. James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 44;
Editorial, Patently Absurd, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2006, at A14; Kevin Drum,
Chart of the Day:
Patent Quality Declining, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 21, 2011),
http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2011/09/chart-day-patent-quality-declining
(asserting that, on average, the quality of U.S. patents has become “noticeably worse over
the past decade”); accord Wagner, supra note 1, at 2144 (“[A]s the patent system grows in
importance—by both increasing in size and in visibility to the modern knowledge
economy—the importance of this public perception will increase.”).
6. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC
PLAN 5 (2003), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/stratplan_
03feb2003.pdf (stating that patent quality is the PTO’s “highest priority” and is therefore
emphasized in every component of its strategic plan); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
2010–2015 STRATEGIC PLAN (2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/
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recently, Congress passed the most sweeping patent legislation in at least
half a century7 based in part on the promise that it will improve patent
quality.8
Yet there is a vocal minority that rejects this pessimistic account.
Largely relying on PTO data, this group contends that patent quality has
stayed the same or even has improved in recent years.9 Finally, there is a
third faction that agrees that the number of bad U.S. patents is excessive,
but does not find this state of affairs particularly troubling given the low
percentage of patents that are ever litigated or licensed.10
Notably absent from the ongoing debate about the quality of U.S. patents
is much thoughtful discussion about what constitutes a patent’s quality in
the first place. What features of a patent make it “good” in quality, what
features make it “bad” in quality, and whose opinion matters? Surprisingly,
scholars and policymakers have shown little interest in these questions.

USPTO_2010-2015_Strategic_Plan.pdf (stating that a critical priority of the PTO is to
improve the quality of issued patents); Notice of Roundtables and Request for Comments on
Enhancement in the Quality of Patents and on United States Patent and Trademark Office
Patent Quality Metrics, 75 Fed. Reg. 22,120 (Apr. 27, 2010) (announcing that the PTO will
conduct two roundtables to obtain public input on patent quality improvement and
measurement).
7. This legislation is the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011).
8. See 155 CONG. REC. S2,706 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(asserting that the bill that would eventually become the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
would improve patent quality); David Kappos, Using a Data-Driven Approach for Quality
Improvements, USPTO.GOV(Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/using_
a_data_driven_approach (“Improving patent quality was a key element in building bipartisan
support for the America Invents Act . . . .”).
9. See, e.g., Brief for the Bos. Patent Law Ass’n As Amicus Curiae in Support of
Genentech, Inc., on the Merits at 2–6, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech Inc., et al., 549 U.S.
118 (2007) (No. 05–608), 2006 WL 2126862, at *2–6 (arguing that “there is no plague of
bad patents” and that the PTO has become better at rigorously examining patent applications,
resulting in improvements in the quality of issued patents); Jonathan Barney, Panel
Contribution, in Adams, supra note 4, at 55 (opining that U.S. patent quality “is as high, if
not higher, now than it was five years ago”); Patrick Doody, The Patent System Is Not
Broken, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Dec. 2006, at 10, 15 (discrediting claims that patent
quality has decreased in recent years and asserting that the available evidence shows that
patent quality “has stayed about the same, or actually increased, over the past 20 years”); Jon
Dudas, Panel Contribution, in Adams, supra note 4, at 57 (asserting that the PTO’s
“objective measurements tells us that patents today are of higher quality than they were 10 or
even five years ago”); James E. Malackowski & Jonathan A. Barney, What Is Patent
Quality? A Merchant Banc’s Perspective, 43 LES NOUVELLES 123, 125–27 (2008) (asserting
that some of the statistical evidence the authors analyzed suggests that patent examination
quality, and therefore patent quality, has either remained steady or has even improved over
the past five years); Susan Walmsley Graf, Comment, Improving Patent Quality Through
Identification of Relevant Prior Art: Approaches To Increase Information Flow to the
Patent Office, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 495, 500–01 (2000) (citing the PTO’s internal
quality assessment audits and data collected by the University of Houston Law Center on
patent invalidity decisions as indicators that “patent quality may be increasing slightly”).
10. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L.
REV. 1495, 1497 (2001) (claiming that because so few patents are ever asserted, it makes
more economic sense for society to make detailed validity determinations in those few cases
than to invest additional resources examining patents that will never be asserted).
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The absence of work in this definitional space may mean one of three
things. First, it may reflect that there already exists a consensus on patent
quality’s meaning. Admittedly, few seem to dispute that a good patent at
least satisfies the legal standards of patentability. That is, a good patent, at
a minimum, describes a new, useful, and nonobvious invention covering
eligible subject matter in such full and definite terms that others can
understand how to make and use it.11 But a review of the literature reveals
considerable diversity of opinions as to whether something more than legal
validity is required for a patent to qualify as a good-quality one.12 Far from
there being a consensus on patent quality’s meaning, the matter is
controversial.13
Alternatively, the modest attention paid to patent quality’s meaning may
reflect an understanding that the choice of definition has no real-world
significance. No one has yet established that the definitional choice is
inconsequential, however, and so that seems a weak basis for declining to
study it. In any event, the assumption is wrong; the choice of definition, in
fact, has important normative implications. For one, it provides the basis
for determining what “counts” as a good or bad patent. By establishing a
metric for quality, the definition makes it possible to determine the extent of
any so-called quality crisis and the effectiveness of policies aimed at
containing it.14 It also provides a criterion for evaluating the hundreds of
policies that have been proposed to improve the functioning of the patent
system. If a proposed policy is sure to reduce patent quality, it should be
rejected unless it is expected to produce substantial offsetting benefits. And
a policy whose principal purpose is to enhance patent quality should be
rejected if it is unlikely to actually achieve that purpose.
Third, the lack of interest in patent quality’s meaning may reflect an
assumption that developing a common definition of patent quality is an
impossible task. If there ultimately is no “best” definitional choice, the
analysis may not be worth the effort. Again, however, the analysis has not
yet been performed and so concluding that it would be futile is premature.
In any event, as described below, there are some elements of the definition
on which consensus possibly can be achieved.15
The broad aim of this Article is to draw attention to the definition of
patent quality as an important subject of scholarly inquiry. Its more specific
aim is to call for a return to first principles and begin the process of
11. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112(a)–(b) (2012).
12. See infra notes 27–35 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 4, at 55 (“Patent quality is an elusive term that seems to
mean different things to different people.”); Dennis Crouch, What Can Patent Applicants Do
To Improve Patent Quality?, PATENTLYO (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
2013/01/what-can-patent-applicants-do-to-improve-patent-quality.html (“Patent ‘quality’ has
many different meanings.”).
14. Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An
Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2067 (2007)
(“[T]he extent of the problem [of patent quality], and its impact, is not well understood.”).
15. Cf. Frequently Asked Questions, PAT. QUALITY INDEX, https://www.law.upenn.edu/
blogs/polk/pqi/faq.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (asserting that patent quality is not so
subjective that it cannot meaningfully be quantified).
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operationalizing the meaning of patent quality. In so doing, it hopes to
bring clarity and give direction to the patent quality agenda.
Part I considers the preliminary question of whether examining the
meaning of patent quality is a worthwhile endeavor. Concluding that it is,
Part II looks to the business discipline of quality management for analytical
guidance. Quality management studies the evaluation, measurement, and
strategic improvement of the quality of business products and processes.16
Its scholars have described a multistep approach to constructing a
meaningful definition of quality to support firms’ strategic quality
programs.17 This approach is based on identifying the quality “dimensions”
that emerge from a consideration of the needs and preferences of
stakeholders.
Part III applies this approach to the question of patent quality. In
particular, it describes a formula for understanding patent quality. The next
two sections identify the most important variable in that formula: the
quality dimensions. First, Part IV describes the basic needs and preferences
of four major stakeholders in patent quality. These stakeholders are the
PTO, the courts, patentees, and the public.
Part V then describes five dimensions of quality that emerge from the
stakeholder analysis. These dimensions are: (1) a patent’s probable
validity; (2) clarity of the patent; (3) faithfulness of the patent to the scope
of the invention; (4) social utility of the patented invention; and
(5) commercial success of the patented invention. The first three
dimensions describe the patent document; the last two dimensions describe
the patented invention. Although a patent is a distinct “thing” from its
underlying invention, it may be impossible as a practical matter to separate
the two for purposes of understanding patent quality because the patent is
intended to “capture” the invention. This Article therefore embraces an
expansive understanding of patent quality that takes into account attributes
of both patents and the inventions they describe.
Part VI summarizes the implications of this work. Broadly, it
demonstrates that the meaning of patent quality is far richer than most in the
patent community recognize.
Going forward, commentators and
policymakers are urged to be more thoughtful—as well as transparent—
about their definitional choices. This work also provides a common
vocabulary to use during patent quality conversations that will help make
those conversations more productive.
More specifically, this work calls on commentators and policymakers to
adopt a fundamentally different approach to patent quality’s meaning that is
essentially the inverse of the conventional way of thinking about the
concept. The conventional approach defines a good-quality patent as one
that at a minimum satisfies the existing legal standards of patentability. The
new approach puts “first things first” and asks what it means for a patent to
be good quality without regard to the existing legal standards. It then calls
16. See infra note 56.
17. See infra Part II.B.
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for a recalibration of the standards (among other things) to reflect the
meaning of good patent quality that emerges from that analysis. Ultimately,
following the new approach shifts the focus of reform efforts from the
limited goal of increasing the number of legally valid patents toward the
more relevant goal of increasing the number of good-quality patents.
I. WHY DEFINE PATENT QUALITY?
At the outset, it is important to resolve whether developing a meaning
and theory of patent quality is a worthwhile endeavor. It may be that
dissonance and ambiguity as to patent quality’s definition is an
unobjectionable condition—or even that it is the preferred one.18
This Part concludes that it is neither, given the placement of qualityimprovement efforts at the top of the patent reform agenda. Surely, where
an issue has achieved a place of such political prominence, it is fair, even
advisable, to probe the basis for identifying the issue as a problem in the
first place. Moreover, it is difficult to have productive conversations about
patent quality when so many participating in the conversation do not define
what they mean by that concept or, when they do, adopt vague or
conflicting meanings. For at least these reasons, the meaning of patent
quality merits a close look.
A. Opinions on the Meaning of Patent Quality Are Diverse,
Underdeveloped, and Ambiguous
Although patent quality has been identified as a problem in the United
States since the early years of the Patent Office,19 the meaning of the
concept has so far escaped serious scrutiny. Since that time, many of those
who have written on the state of patent quality have done so without
explicitly defining the concept.20 Instead, those commentators either have
taken the meaning of the concept as a given—that is, they have assumed
that the audience shares their understanding of the concept—or they have
left it to the audience to discern their intended meaning from context.
When that meaning can be discerned, commentators have rarely attempted
to justify it.21 The assumption seems to be that no justification is necessary
because the meaning of the concept is uncontroversial.

18. Cf. Gerald F. Smith, The Meaning of Quality, 4 TOTAL QUALITY MGMT. 235, 235
(1993) (“Academics often over-state the importance of defining one’s terms.”).
19. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Scott R. Boalick, Patent Quality and the Dedication Rule, 11 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 215, 267, 269 (2004) (referring to patent quality at various points in terms of
certainty, validity, and breadth without explicitly defining it); David J. Kappos & Stuart
Graham, The Case for Standard Measures of Patent Quality, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Mar.
20, 2012, at 19, 19 (advocating for standard measures of patent quality without defining the
concept).
21. See, e.g., James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189,
202 (2006) (defining, without further explanation, “quality patents” as “patents with welldefined property rights that are neither overinclusive nor underinclusive”).
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If that were true, one would expect commentators to recite or suggest
only one definition. An examination of the literature, however, reveals
considerable definitional variability.22 To be sure, there seems to be a
consensus that a good-quality patent is at least one that satisfies all of the
statutory conditions of patentability. It is the duty of PTO examiners to
evaluate whether a patent application complies with these conditions, and in
deference to that evaluation, all issued patents are presumed valid.23 The
presumption can be overcome by a showing of clear and convincing
evidence,24 however, and those who challenge validity are in fact frequently
successful.25 Because invalid patents, by definition, never should have
issued, there is a shared understanding that a good-quality patent is at least
a legally valid one.26 Implicit in that understanding, though, is the
assumption that the validity standards have been—and even can be—
calibrated and consistently applied to reflect good patent quality in the first
place.
While there is general agreement that validity is relevant to quality,
scholars, industry members, the PTO, and the public disagree on whether
validity is the exclusive standard by which to judge patent quality. Many
members of the patent community believe that it is.27 But more than a few
22. Some of these definitions are summarized in DAN PRUD’HOMME, DULLING THE
CUTTING-EDGE: HOW PATENT-RELATED POLICIES AND PRACTICES HAMPER INNOVATION IN
CHINA 22–24 (2012), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47617/1/MPRA_
paper_43299.pdf.
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012).
24. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242–43 (2011) (affirming
that a challenger must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence).
25. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (finding an invalidity rate of 46 percent for written,
final validity decisions by the federal district courts and the Federal Circuit from 1989 to
1996); Mann & Underweiser, supra note 1, at 8 (finding an invalidity rate of 60 percent for
Federal Circuit decisions from 2003 to 2009, excluding cases in which validity decisions
were vacated and remanded); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An
Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 390 (2000) (finding an
invalidity rate of 33 percent for combined judge and jury decisions for patent cases that went
to trial between 1983 and 1999).
26. Nevertheless, the legal standards are not always equally emphasized when patent
quality is being assessed. For example, those who believe software patents are “bad” are
concerned that such patents protect algorithms that fall outside the scope of protected subject
matter defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 or are so ambiguous that, in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
it is impossible to understand the contours of the invention. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch,
Making Software Patents Transparent and Understandable: Begin by Determining Whether
Software Is Patentable, PATENTLYO (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/
10/making-software-patents-transparent-and-understandable-begin-by-determining-whethersoftware-is-patentable.html. By contrast, those who denounce patents on things like the
crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich are usually complaining that these inventions are
either not new or are obvious in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. See Mark Lemley et
al., What To Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005–2006, at 10.
27. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct
Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 748 (2009) (stating that patents that meet the validity
requirements “are considered to be of good quality”); Ben McEniery, Physicality and the
Information Age: A Normative Perspective on the Patent Eligibility of Non-physical
Methods, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 106, 150 (2010) (defining “[a] quality patent [as]
one likely to meet the requirements of novelty, inventiveness and sufficiency of
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appear to embrace a more complex view according to which a good-quality
patent must possess additional characteristics. For example, some
commentators view the concept of value as relevant to patent quality, while
others are adamant that it is not.28 Other commentators use value as a
proxy for quality29 or even use the terms interchangeably.30
For the most part, the PTO has adopted a definition of patent quality that
equates it with patent validity. The agency’s quality metrics, for example,
are focused on identifying issued patents that, upon further review, are
invalid, as well as applications that bear markers of invalidity.31 Yet
elsewhere the PTO has suggested that it has a higher standard for quality.
For example, the PTO recently proposed rules—the stated purpose of which
is to improve patent quality—that would require patent applicants to use
standardized claim templates, provide glossaries of terms, and designate
default dictionaries.32 Notably, each of these rules promotes clarity of
claim terms well beyond what is required for a patent to be valid.
The range of opinions on the question of patent quality is on full display
in a 2008 article in the professional journal Intellectual Asset Management
that asked nineteen patent professionals around the world to define patent

specification, and thus not likely to be found invalid if challenged”); Lee Petherbridge,
Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 175 (2006) (defining “[q]uestionable, or low quality,
patents” as those that fail to meet the standards for patentability); John R. Thomas, The
Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration
Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 730 (2002) (“Quality patents are, in short, valid
patents.”).
28. These opposing views are represented by Sivaramjani Thambisetty, who defines
quality in terms of a patent’s technological significance and commercial importance,
Sivaramjani Thambisetty, Patents As Credence Goods, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 707,
709–10 (2007), and Polk Wagner, who writes that a patent’s quality is distinct from and
should not be confused with its value, Wagner, supra note 1, at 2138–39.
29. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 997 (2003) (explaining that “patent quality and value are
interwoven in inextricable ways” such that “value can probably be characterized as quality
plus other factors”).
30. See, e.g., Patent Quality Improvement: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2 (2003)
(statement of Rep. Howard Berman) (“The quality of a patent is synonymous with the value
of that patent . . . .”); Mark Liang, Chinese Patent Quality: Running the Numbers and
Possible Remedies, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 478, 491 (2012) (referring to the
quantification of patent quality in terms of “assessing the objective ‘value’ of a patent”);
Malackowski & Barney, supra note 9, at 129 (“[P]atent quality from a merchant banc’s
perspective is . . . synonymous with value.”).
31. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ADOPTION OF METRICS FOR THE ENHANCEMENT
OF PATENT QUALITY FISCAL YEAR 2011 (2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/
init_events/qual_comp_metric.pdf. The first two metrics involve subjective determinations
of individual applications and patents based on “clear error” as to the patent’s validity; the
third and fourth metrics involve subjective determinations of individual applications based
on compliance with best practices; the fifth metric is a global, statistical representation of
quality-related events in the prosecution of patent applications; and the sixth and seventh
metrics measure subjective perceptions of examination quality. Id. at 4–14.
32. Request for Comments on Preparation of Patent Applications, 78 Fed. Reg. 2960
(Jan. 15, 2013).
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quality. Some respondents equated quality solely with validity,33 while
others noted a place in the quality calculus for additional attributes.34 For
example, one respondent defined patent quality to “cover an invention that
is meaningful; creates commercial advantage; has well-written claims,
maximising the coverage; and has been filed and prosecuted correctly.”35
The job of sorting out these diverse opinions is complicated by the fact
that they typically are expressed in a conclusory fashion. One sentence, or
a few, is all the textual space that typically is devoted to the definition.36
Further, the attributes identified as relevant sometimes lend themselves to
multiple interpretations, none of which is specified. For example, those
who suggest that value is relevant to patent quality do not always specify
whether they are referring to the value of the patent or the value of the
invention it describes.37 Yet these two values are distinct.38
Adding yet another layer of ambiguity is the fact that one may have high
quality standards for the patents that she owns but relatively low quality
standards for patents owned by others, or vice versa. Those who offer
definitions of patent quality do not often clarify the populations that are the
intended definitional targets.39 And it otherwise can be difficult to
determine from context whether a proposed definition of patent quality is
personal to the author and her business interests or is intended for broader
application.
B. Clarity and Consensus on the Meaning of Patent Quality
Promotes Sound Policymaking
The coarseness, ambiguity, and diversity of opinions on patent quality’s
meaning create several challenges for policymakers. First, it is difficult to
determine whether there exists a quality problem in need of remediation
when those participating in the conversation understand patent quality to
mean different things and do not use a common language to communicate
their views. Again, this point is well illustrated in the 2008 article featuring
33. See, e.g., Schecter & Underweiser, supra note 4, at 65 (“Patent quality refers to how
well a patent meets the legal criteria for patentability.”).
34. See, e.g., Lars Kellberg & Reza Green, Panel Contribution, in Adams, supra note 4,
at 61 (“[A] quality patent is one that has claims of broad enough scope to provide a useful
swath of exclusivity to the patent holder . . . .”).
35. Stephen Potter, Panel Contribution, in Adams, supra note 4, at 64.
36. For example, a scholarly article devoted to identifying mechanisms that impact
patent quality discusses the question of its meaning in six sentences. See Wagner, supra note
1, at 2138–39. Two of the six sentences set forth a positive definition; the remaining four
sentences state that patent value is irrelevant to quality. Id. An exception to the summary
nature of most definitions can be found in Graf, supra note 9, at 499–500 (describing three
basic approaches to the definitional question that focus on validity, certainty, and value).
37. See, e.g., Potter, supra note 35, at 64 (defining a quality patent in terms of whether it
“creates commercial advantage” without identifying whether that advantage is a result of the
legal rights that attach to the patent, the patented invention, or both).
38. See infra Parts IV.C, V.D–E.
39. For instance, most of the patent professionals who contributed to the 2008 article in
Intellectual Asset Magazine did not identify their intended definitional targets. See Adams,
supra note 4.
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the opinions of nineteen prominent patent professionals. Some respondents
asserted that U.S. patent quality has declined in recent years, while others
asserted that it has improved or stayed the same.40
As that article suggests, some persons define bad quality narrowly so that
the universe of bad-quality patents is much smaller than, and therefore not
as troubling as, the universe of bad-quality patents constructed by those
who define bad quality more expansively. The former group is less likely
to view patent quality as an issue that merits intervention. The latter group
may agree that intervention is warranted, but its members will likely have
different ideas about the best way to proceed. Because they disagree on
what quality means, they disagree on which policies should be developed
and implemented for the purpose of improving quality. They also disagree
on how to measure whether those policies, once implemented, are working
and so should be continued or are failing and so should be canceled.
At bottom, the controversy surrounding the meaning of patent quality is a
species of what is known as problem definition. Policy scholars describe
problem definition as “the strategic representation of situations”; in
essence, how the problem is defined dictates the extent of the problem and
its solution.41 Many legal reforms have been shaped by strategic problem
definition, including those related to punitive damages and class action
suits.42 Patent law is also no stranger to issues of problem definition. Most
recently, the debate over the problem of so-called patent “trolls” has turned
in part on the definition of a troll, with expansive definitions suggesting that
trolls do more social and economic harm than they do when more narrowly
defined.43
Whether the problem is patent trolls or patent quality, it is inefficient to
spend resources developing and implementing solutions to a problem
without clarity on what exactly is the problem. It is also less likely that the
40. Compare Mercer, supra note 4, at 63–64 (noting that quality has declined), and
Schecter & Underweiser, supra note 4, at 65 (same), with Dudas, supra note 9 (stating that
quality has improved), and Kellberg & Green, supra note 34 (noting that quality is
approximately the same).
41. DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 106 (1988).
42. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages, Change, and the
Politics of Ideas: Defining Public Policy Problems, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 71, 95 (addressing
the politics of the alleged problem defined as the “‘explosion’ of punitive damage awards”
(quoting S. 565, The Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transp., 104th Cong. 415 (1995) (statement of Theodore B. Olson, attorney)));
Nan S. Ellis, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Story Behind the Statute, 35 J.
LEGIS. 76 (2009) (considering the impact of problem definition on the enactment of the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005).
43. See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-practicing
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 440–41 (2014) (criticizing a study by
James Bessen and Michael Meurer placing the direct costs of patent trolls—also known as
nonpracticing entities (NPEs)—at $29 billion on grounds that the study’s definition of an
NPE is overbroad, noting that “[o]bviously, narrowing the definition of non-practicing entity
would lower Bessen & Meurer’s $29 billion figure”). See also generally John M. Golden,
“Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2112 n.7 (2007) (“[A] widely
accepted definition of a patent troll has yet to be devised.”).
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solutions that are implemented will be effective. Today, there are hundreds
of policy proposals on the patent reform table. Collectively, these proposals
seek to change the legal rules, administrative procedures, institutional
responsibilities, regulatory mechanisms, and behavioral norms that operate
at virtually every level of the patent system. Individually, these proposals
include:
 changes to the
interpretation;44

legal

standards

of

patentability

and

their

 changes to the examining capacity of the PTO and the competence
standards of its examiners;45
 changes to the procedures according to which applicants submit and
the PTO evaluates patent applications;46
 changes to the procedures according to which patents are challenged
and enforced;47
 changes to the regulations governing those who draft (or “prosecute”)
patents;48 and
 changes to the incentives that affect the behavior of patentees.49

Each of these proposals is directed at improving the operation of the U.S.
patent system, and many of them are directed at doing so, specifically and
primarily, by improving patent quality. But there are insufficient resources
44. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 39, 64–72 (2008) (proposing a redefinition of the obviousness standard using
economic principles).
45. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577,
606–09 (1999) (arguing that the PTO should raise the salaries of senior examiners to induce
them to stay and increase the training of junior examiners).
46. See, e.g., Request for Comments on Preparation of Patent Applications, 78 Fed. Reg.
2960 (Jan. 15, 2013) (seeking public comment on practices by patent applicants that will
potentially improve patent quality, such as use of a standardized template for each claim and
designation of a default dictionary); Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks To Create a Better
Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 784–86 (2002) (calling for mandatory technical
methods of disclosure for software patents); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking
Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 61–63 (2007) (arguing that the
PTO should provide patentees the option to “gold-plate” their patents by subjecting them to a
more vigorous examination at the PTO).
47. See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 46, at 776–83 (arguing for establishing a new
preissuance opposition proceeding before the PTO); Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 46, at
59–61 (arguing that the presumption of validity that attaches to issued patents should be
weakened).
48. See, e.g., Ralph D. Clifford, Thomas G. Field, Jr. & Jon R. Cavicchi, A Statistical
Analysis of the Patent Bar: Where Are the Software-Savvy Patent Attorneys?, 11 N.C. J.L.
& TECH. 223 (2010) (arguing that entry requirements to the patent bar should be expanded to
include more computer scientists); Corey B. Blake, Note, Ghost of the Past: Does the
USPTO’s Scientific and Technical Background Requirement Still Make Sense?, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 735, 757–63 (2004) (arguing for the elimination of the technical qualification
requirement or, alternatively, the expansion of recognized disciplines).
49. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 1, at 2165–72 (arguing for reforms that would increase
applicants’ incentives to file high-quality patents and decrease their incentives to file lowquality patents).
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to adopt every promising policy that is proposed, and it would be irrational
to do so given that each proposal presents a unique cost-benefit profile. In
developing a strategy to optimize patent quality, it is necessary to choose
among the policies on the reform table. What standards should govern that
decision?
There are obviously many factors to consider when deciding whether to
adopt or reject a particular reform, including its economic, political, and
practical feasibility. When it comes to policies affecting the patent system,
an additional factor that should be considered is impact on patent quality.
That is because good patents are almost universally considered to be a
crucial output of a properly functioning patent system.50 And rightly or
wrongly, there is widespread concern that the universe of U.S. patents
includes an unacceptable number of bad patents.51 As summarized by one
scholar, “There is perhaps no patent issue with a higher profile than patent
quality.”52
A proposed policy that is intended to improve the functioning of the
patent system therefore should be rejected if it is sure to reduce patent
quality, unless it provides substantial offsetting benefits. And a proposed
policy whose principal purpose is to enhance patent quality should be
rejected if it is unlikely to actually achieve that purpose. Where a policy
satisfies these standards, then the decision whether to adopt or reject it
should be determined in reference to other criteria.
Finally, the meaning of patent quality dictates how to evaluate the
effectiveness of policies after their implementation. There is a maxim of
business management that says, “[I]f you can’t measure it, you can’t
manage it,” and so it is with quality.53 If the number of bad patents is found
to increase rather than decrease after a specific policy is implemented, this
is an important fact to know in deciding whether to continue or cancel the
reform. But the metric cannot be used without agreement at the outset as to
what constitutes a bad patent.54 In other words, we cannot count the
number of good and bad patents until we know what counts as a good or
bad patent. Moreover, that calculation will not accurately reflect a policy’s
50. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Issues
Examination Guidelines To Better Define the Scope of Patent Protection and Thereby
Improve Patent Quality, Release 11-11 (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
news/pr/2011/11_11a.jsp (“Patent quality is essential to the proper functioning of the patent
system.”).
51. See supra notes 1, 3–8 and accompanying text.
52. Wagner, supra note 1, at 2172; see also Adams, supra note 4, at 55 (“Ask anyone in
the world of patents to name their top three issues and you can be sure that the importance of
quality will be mentioned.”); Interview with Howard Shelanski, Director, FTC Bureau of
Economics, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2012, at 7 (answering, “Well, I think that anything that
could improve patent quality is extremely important,” when asked whether any recent patent
law changes were of particular interest to the FTC).
53. David A. Garvin, Building a Learning Organization, in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
ON KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 70 (1998).
54. Cf. Carol A. Reeves & David A. Bednar, Defining Quality: Alternatives and
Implications, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 419, 419, 436–39 (1994) (explaining that difficulties
defining quality in the business context had led to inconsistent and contradictory empirical
results regarding the relationships between quality and market share, costs, and profits).
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performance if there is a mismatch between the definition that is the basis
for the metric and the definition that is the basis for the policy.
II. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: PRODUCT QUALITY
The concept of patent quality has a long history of loose interpretation
lacking analytical rigor. If the meaning of that concept is to give useful
direction to policymakers, a more systematic approach to understanding it is
needed. The question this Article now turns to is: what should that
approach look like?
For help with this question, I looked to the literature of quality
management. Having emerged as a business discipline in its own right over
the past sixty years,55 quality management focuses on evaluating,
measuring, and thinking strategically about the quality of products and
services provided by firms.56
Over time, many have attempted to define what quality means in the
business world. The result has been a proliferation of definitions, none of
which has proven fully satisfactory.57 In the mid-1980s, however,
management scholars began working to identify common themes in these
competing definitions.58 In the process, they developed a general approach
to understanding quality’s meaning in a commercial context that is widely
cited in the management literature today.59
The work of management scholars in this definitional space provides a
helpful roadmap to those interested in defining patent quality. For one,
their scholarship is mature, representing over thirty years of analysis—more
if the presynthesis literature is included.60 Given that management scholars
have sought to answer the same conceptual question as the one addressed
here, it makes sense to consult their work.61 Indeed, it would seem unwise
not to do so. Accordingly, although the definitional approach described by
management scholars is not the only methodology that can or perhaps even
55. See generally Kevin Dooley, The Paradigms of Quality: Evolution and Revolution
in the History of the Discipline, 5 ADVANCES MGMT. ORG. QUALITY 2 (2000) (describing the
history of quality management as a discipline).
56. S. THOMAS FOSTER, MANAGING QUALITY: INTEGRATING THE SUPPLY CHAIN 17–18
(5th ed. 2013).
57. David A. Garvin, What Does “Product Quality” Really Mean?, MIT SLOAN MGMT.
REV., Fall 1984, at 25, 26; accord Reeves & Bednar, supra note 54, at 436–39 (describing
the strengths and weaknesses of various proposed definitions).
58. See, e.g., Garvin, supra note 57, at 26–28; Reeves & Bednar, supra note 54, at 435–
36.
59. See, e.g., JAMES R. EVANS & WILLIAM M. LINDSAY, MANAGING FOR QUALITY AND
PERFORMANCE EXCELLENCE 44 n.6 (9th ed. 2012) (citing the definitional work of Garvin and
another management scholar, Gerald Smith); FOSTER, supra note 56, at 3–5, 39–40
(describing the definitional work of management scholars David Garvin and Genichi
Taguchi).
60. See generally Dooley, supra note 55.
61. Cf. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology: The Prospects for an
Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 389, 405 (“[I]t is generally easier for
scholars to make connections between their work and the work in other disciplines if the
practitioners of the other disciplines are attempting to address the same substantive
problems.”).
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should be applied to the question of patent quality’s meaning, it is a sound
place to begin the analysis.
A. Conceptual Quality
That analysis begins with the understanding that quality is fundamentally
a concept.62 Concepts can be distinguished according to their linguistic
category, and the concept of quality falls under the category of a property
attribute.63 That is, quality refers to a characteristic of some object or
entity, such as a thing, a state, or a process.64
While some property attributes like weight and color are directly
measurable, quality is not.65 That is because quality is not a physical
feature of a thing.66 Rather, it is an abstract feature.67 Assessing the quality
of some thing may involve measuring its attributes—or “dimensions”—but
those measurements serve only as a proxy for the thing’s quality.68
Particular attributes of a thing can be better or worse proxies for its
quality. The measurements of those attributes therefore reflect the thing’s
quality only to the extent that the attributes are good proxies for quality. If
they are bad proxies, their measurements are useless. This point
underscores the need to take great care in identifying the quality dimensions
that serve as the basis for judging a thing’s quality.
Another important feature of conceptual quality is its indication of the
relationship between a thing’s quality dimensions and an evaluative
standard or criterion. The standard may be an objective one reflecting the
ideal prototype that people generally conceive for the thing.69 Or the
standard may be a subjective one based on the interests, needs, preferences,
or values of individuals or groups who use or otherwise have an interest in
the thing.70
B. Product Quality
These two aspects of conceptual quality are captured in the following
definition of commercial quality that appears in the management literature:
“Quality is the goodness or excellence of any product, process, structure or
other thing that an organization consists of or creates. It is assessed against
accepted standards of merit for such things and against the interests/needs
of producers, consumers and other stakeholders.”71 Although the definition
covers both commercial products and processes, patents are more akin to

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See Smith, supra note 18, at 236.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 241.
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things than events and so the remainder of this Article will focus on the
more relevant application of the definition to commercial products.
Consistent with the distinction between conceptual quality and quality
dimensions, the first part of the definition equating quality with excellence
is careful to describe the concept as transcendent in nature rather than by
reference to specific characteristics.72 The second part clarifies that quality
is a function of any objective standards that might exist for a thing and the
subjective standards of stakeholders. Of course, it may be impossible to
identify any truly objective quality standards for a product beyond what is
already obvious, like freedom from defects that prevent the product from
performing. That is because people have different needs and preferences
with respect to the products they encounter that depend on their relationship
to those products. In any event, because objective quality standards are, by
definition, universally accepted, those standards necessarily will emerge in
an analysis of subjective quality standards.73 An attempt to identify
relevant quality standards therefore may be described as a single inquiry
into the common and unique standards of stakeholders.
Another way to understand the product-quality definition is to frame it as
a three-step process.74 First, identify the relevant stakeholders and their
common and unique standards for the quality of a product as dictated by
their individual interests and needs. Second, identify the dimensions of
quality that emerge from the stakeholder analysis.
A particular
stakeholder’s perspective might translate into one quality dimension or
many, and the same quality dimension may or may not be preferred by
multiple stakeholders. Third, measure the product’s merit with respect to
each dimension and consolidate those partial scores into a final judgment on
quality.
Strategic quality management focuses on the first two steps and attempts
to maximize the total quality score across an entire product category at the
lowest marginal cost.75 For any given product, each quality dimension
helps define a minimum universe of desirable features of the product
category. But it is not always possible or cost-effective for manufacturers to
attempt to optimize quality along every dimension, and certainly not at the
same time.76

72. But see Garvin, supra note 57, at 25 (identifying the transcendent meaning of quality
as one of several major approaches to the definition rather than, as Smith contends, the one
true meaning of quality).
73. See David A. Garvin, Competing on the Eight Dimensions of Quality, HARV. BUS.
REV., Nov.–Dec. 1987, at 101, 104 (explaining that some subjective preferences “are so
universal that they have the force of an objective standard”).
74. See Smith, supra note 18, at 236.
75. See Garvin, supra note 57, at 33.
76. Garvin, supra note 73, at 108. In the 1980s, for example, Steinway & Sons focused
on developing a reputation for high-quality, handmade pianos that are distinctive in sound
and style, while Yamaha built a reputation for quality based on reliability and conformance
to specifications. See id. The dimensions on which each company strategically chose to
compete (at the expense of other dimensions) are called “quality niches.” See id. at 104; see
also Garvin, supra note 57, at 33.
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This is where the definitional work becomes especially important. By
taking the time to identify a product’s dimensions associated with quality, a
firm can tailor its operations around exactly—and only—those functions
and tasks that will maximize quality along the selected niches. As
explained by a leading scholar in this area, firms that wish to compete in
quality must “first develop a clear vocabulary with which to discuss quality
as a strategy.”77 It is only after breaking down the concept of quality into
manageable parts that firms can develop a competitive plan for quality.78
C. Application
Synthesizing the various definitions of product quality that have been
offered over the years, management theorists have identified several
perspectives on product quality that are associated with essentially three
different stakeholder groups: manufacturers, consumers, and the public.
The manufacturing-oriented group is comprised of design engineers and
operations managers.79 Their perspective on quality is straightforward: a
quality product is one that conforms to design and manufacturing
specifications.80 All products involve specifications for parts and materials,
among other things, and these specifications are normally expressed in
terms of an allowed range from a target or “center.”81 A product that
deviates beyond this range is, according to the manufacturing-based
approach, low in quality.82
This perspective dominated the early modern quality management
movement.83
Over time, however, management scholars came to
appreciate the limitations of a meaning of quality based solely on a
manufacturing perspective. An S-Class Mercedes that conforms to all
applicable standards is good quality according to manufacturing
stakeholders, but so is—to no less a degree—a fully conforming Chevette.84
That these two kinds of cars would receive equal quality ratings reveals a

77. Garvin, supra note 73, at 103.
78. See id.; cf. Kristie W. Seawright & Scott T. Young, A Quality Definition Continuum,
26 INTERFACES 107, 107 (1996) (explaining that effective quality management programs
“require consensus or cross-functional goals that must be based on a shared understanding of
quality definitions”).
79. See Garvin, supra note 57, at 27–28.
80. Id. at 28.
81. Garvin, supra note 73, at 105.
82. See Garvin, supra note 57, at 31.
83. See Reeves & Bednar, supra note 54, at 421–22 (explaining the early 1900s
“American system of manufacturing” according to which the “key to quality was
conformance to specifications”). The “zero-defects” theory of quality developed by Philip
Crosby in the 1960s, for example, is consistent with this perspective. See Zero
Defects, LOCKHEEDMARTIN.COM, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/100years/stories/zerodefects.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (explaining the success of the “zero defects”
program at Lockheed Martin during the 1960s).
84. Garvin, supra note 57, at 28.
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major shortcoming of the manufacturing approach: a product that is
perfectly “in spec” may still fail to satisfy user needs and preferences.85
In appreciation of this shortcoming, in the mid-twentieth century, the end
user emerged as the most important quality stakeholder in most industries.86
The user-based approach to quality defines quality as “fitness for use”
according to which higher-quality products are those that best satisfy user
needs and preferences.87 Of course, there are several problems with this
approach, including the difficulty of aggregating idiosyncratic views in
order to produce meaningful definitions of quality for designers and
marketers.88
Most recently, a third stakeholder in product quality has risen to
prominence: the public. The social-loss approach to product quality
defines it in terms of “the loss a product causes to society after being
shipped, other than any losses caused by its intrinsic functions.”89 Such
losses result from variability in product functions as well as harmful side
effects to bystanders, including uncompensated loss to others.90 For
example, a car that does not start in cold weather is low quality according to
this approach because the owner suffers a financial loss in car repairs and
the owner’s employer suffers a financial loss in reduced work performed by
the tardy employee.91
The second step of the definitional process is to identify the quality
dimensions that emerge from the stakeholder analysis. The manufacturing
and user perspectives generate eight basic quality dimensions of
commercial products: conformance to specifications; performance features;
secondary features; reliability; durability; serviceability; perceived quality;
and aesthetics.92 The social-loss approach generates two additional quality
dimensions: variability in product function and side effects.93 Together,
these ten dimensions can be used to define the quality of a product,
although they are not necessarily exclusive or mandatory in every case.94
The third step is to measure a particular product’s performance along
each of the relevant dimensions and to consolidate these partial scores into
85. See id.; Laura B. Forker, Quality: American, Japanese, and Soviet Perspectives, 5
ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 63, 73 (1991).
86. Reeves & Bednar, supra note 54, at 423–27 (“The most pervasive definition of
quality currently in use is the extent to which a product or service meets and/or exceeds a
customer’s expectations.”).
87. QUALITY CONTROL HANDBOOK, at 2.2 (Joseph M. Juran et al. eds., 3d ed. 1974).
88. Garvin, supra note 57, at 27.
89. GENICHI TAGUCHI, INTRODUCTION TO QUALITY ENGINEERING: DESIGNING QUALITY
INTO PRODUCTS AND PROCESSES 1 (1986).
90. Id. at 2.
91. JIJU ANTONY & MIKE KAYE, EXPERIMENTAL QUALITY: A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO
ACHIEVE AND IMPROVE QUALITY 18 (2000).
92. Garvin, supra note 73, at 104–07; Garvin, supra note 57, at 29–32.
93. TAGUCHI, supra note 89, at 2.
94. Fewer or additional dimensions may be required, depending on the specific product
category under consideration. For example, computer software may implicate two additional
quality dimensions of integrity (the extent to which unauthorized access can be controlled)
and portability (the ease of transfer between environments). See Garvin, supra note 73, at
108.
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an overall judgment of the product’s quality. While this last step must be
performed to evaluate a particular product, only the first two steps are
required to develop strategies for improving the quality of entire product
categories.
III. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: PATENT QUALITY
This Part translates the management literature on defining product quality
into a framework for defining patent quality. It begins by explaining why
the insights of management theorists are particularly relevant to the patent
context—and by identifying limits to the analogy. It then proposes a basic
formula for assessing patent quality that can be used to identify efficient
strategies for maximizing overall patent quality.
A. From Product Quality to Patent Quality
As described at the outset of Part II, the work of management scholars in
defining product quality provides a helpful roadmap to those interested in
defining patent quality. This is especially so given the similarities between
manufacturing a commercial good and a patent that render the definitional
work on product quality particularly relevant to the patent context. The
typical process for manufacturing a good—also known as “realizing a
product”—begins when a design engineer, usually in response to
information about user needs and preferences, drafts specifications for a
specific product.95 The product is then manufactured in accordance with
those specifications.96 Afterwards, the product is subjected to qualitycontrol procedures to ensure that its parts and operation fall within the
accepted range of deviation.97 If it does, the product is shipped for sale to
end users. If it does not, the product may be destroyed or repaired,
depending on the cost of the fix. Post-sale, a user may discover that,
despite the best efforts of the manufacturer, the product suffers from a
defect that renders it inoperable or otherwise worthless. When that occurs,
the user may discard the product or ask the manufacturer or a third party to
repair the defect.
The process for “manufacturing” a patent follows a similar path. That
process begins when an inventor, typically through a patent attorney or
agent, drafts an application for a patent that is intended to comply with the
“specifications” set forth in the patent laws and the administrative rules that
interpret them. The application includes two main parts: the specification
and a set of claims.98 The specification contains a detailed description
(typically including drawings) of the invention and explains how it solves a
particular problem.99 The patent then concludes with a set of claims.100
95. See CORRADO POLI, DESIGN FOR MANUFACTURING: A STRUCTURED APPROACH 3–6
(2001) (explaining the stages of product realization).
96. See id. at 6.
97. See id. at 7.
98. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Each claim is a technical sentence that describes a unique invention,
although all of the claims set forth in a patent relate to the same inventive
concept.101 Because each claim of a patent is separately evaluated to
determine its legal validity and infringement,102 it is probably more
accurate to refer to “claim quality” than “patent quality.” Nevertheless, this
Article follows the convention of using the term patent quality to refer
generally to the quality of a patent’s claims.
After the inventor’s agent files the application, the PTO assigns one or
more examiners to evaluate the application to determine whether it
complies with the relevant legal requirements.103 The examiner and agent
then engage in what is typically a long process of refinement according to
which the examiner usually rejects one or more claims for
noncompliance.104 When this occurs, the agent responds by trying to
convince the examiner that the rejection is improper, by amending or
canceling the rejected claims, or by appealing the rejection.105 In the bestcase scenario for the inventor, this refinement process ends when the
examiner approves one or more claims and the PTO issues a patent setting
forth the approved claims.106 The patent owner (or her competitor) may
later discover that the patent suffers from a defect that renders one or more
of its claims legally invalid or commercially worthless. When this occurs,
the owner may abandon the patent or attempt to cure the defect at the PTO
or in court.107
So described, each patent claim can be understood as a kind of product
manufactured cooperatively by an inventor’s agent and the PTO that
ultimately has passed a kind of quality assurance review conducted by the
PTO. Indeed, of all the forms of intellectual property, the manufacturing
analogy is the most applicable to patents. While copyrights and some

101. See id. (stating that the claims must describe what the inventor “regards as his
invention”). For example, one patent claim may describe a new widget, and a second claim
may describe a method of using the new widget.
102. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, LLC, 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (“[I]nfringement and validity analyses must be performed on a claim-by-claim
basis.”).
103. 35 U.S.C. § 131; 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a)(1) (2013); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE chs. 700, 2100 (8th ed. 2012) (setting forth the procedures according to which
the PTO evaluates patents for conformance with the legal standards of patentability).
104. See Dennis Crouch, Likelihood of Office Action Rejections, PATENTLYO (June 15,
2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/06/likelihood-of-office-action-rejections.html
(finding that, based on an examination of 20,000 published patent applications, between 77
and 93 percent of applications across all PTO Technology Units were initially rejected and
between 27 and 47 percent were finally rejected).
105. The examination process is described in chapter 700 of the MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 103. The appeals process is described in chapter 1200.
106. 35 U.S.C. §§ 131, 151.
107. A patent owner can affirmatively disclaim any part of her patent, or any part of its
term, 37 C.F.R. § 1.321, or let the patent lapse by failing to pay maintenance fees, 35 U.S.C.
§ 41(b)(2). A patent owner can also attempt to cure defects by, among other things, seeking
a reissue or advocating a construction of the patent that will avoid the defects. See infra
notes 139, 244 and accompanying text.
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trademark rights are automatic,108 patents only issue following a rigorous
and prolonged process of collaborative engineering and examination.
While there are notable similarities between products and patents,
however, there are also notable differences. First, the identity of a product
is typically self-contained. The identity of a widget, for example, is based
on its attributes as a widget. The identity of a patent, however, is closely
linked to the identity of the invention it describes. Indeed, the existential
relationship between the two is so close that the patent is said to “capture”
the invention.109
Yet the patent has attributes—legal, economic, and social—distinct from
the invention. The patent is therefore a different ontological “thing” than the
invention.110 Consequently, the quality of a patent does not exactly
correspond with the quality of the invention it describes. Still, it may be
impossible as a practical matter to separate the two. That is because the
nature of the invention—its subject matter, utility, and significance—will
inevitably play a role in opinions on the quality of a patent describing the
invention.111
The second major difference between commercial products and patents
stems from their different functions. Because a commercial product is a
form of property, a variety of legal rights and obligations necessarily attach
to it.112 But to most observers, a product’s legal function will usually be
secondary to its physical function: to do something. A patent claim also
has a physical function of describing a particular invention, but to most
observers, that function will usually be secondary to the patent’s legal

108. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (providing a federal cause of action for infringement of
unregistered trademarks); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (recognizing copyright ownership without any
filing or notice by the owner).
109. Daniel A. DeVito & Michael P. Dierks, Exploring Anew the Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine in Patent Litigation: The Pendulum Swings Again,
This Time in Favor of Protection, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 103, 129 (1994) (“In drafting the patent
application, the scope of the legal right embodied in the invention is captured in writing.”);
Greg H. Gardella & Emily A. Berger, United States Reexamination Procedures: Recent
Trends, Strategies and Impact on Patent Practice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 381,
406 (2009) (“A well-constructed patent claim that captures the invention more precisely and
accurately will be more valuable because it is more likely to be found valid.”).
110. See Michael J. Madison, Law As Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 383 (2005) (“Traditionally, the notion of the ‘legal’ thing has
been practically and conceptually distinct from the ‘real’ thing. In patent law, for example,
there is the actual device that the inventor developed, and there is the legally distinct thing
that the patentee owns, which the law knows as the patent claim.”).
111. Just as the visual appearance of a coffee cup may affect one’s opinion of a
photograph of that cup, the features of an invention may affect one’s opinion of the patent
claim describing the invention. For example, most observers will perceive a photograph of a
white Styrofoam cup differently than a photograph of an ornate teacup. Similarly, the patent
community typically perceives software and business method patents differently than, for
instance, patents on mechanical inventions. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 1495 (“The
criticism [allowing bad patents] is particularly strong in specific industries, notably software
and Internet ‘business method’ patents.”).
112. See James Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 294 (2013)
(explaining that, for each thing in existence, property laws inform who has authority to
determine how it may be used).
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function: to exclude others from doing something.113 Thus, the primary
function of a hammer is to drive a nail, while the primary function of a
patent on a hammer is to exclude others from making, using, and selling the
hammer.
Third, most products are or can be mass-produced. This means that they
exist in the world as multiple copies, and one’s ownership of any particular
product usually does not interfere with someone else’s ownership of a copy
of that product. Assuming sufficient supply and access, my ownership of
one copy of a particular hammer does not preclude you from owning
another copy of that hammer.
By contrast, patent claims are, by definition, unique.114 Each claim
describes a thing or activity that, within certain parameters, has never
before been disclosed.115 A claim is legally invalid, and therefore ceases to
exist, if it is discovered to be an identical or substantially similar copy of a
preexisting disclosure.116 In this way, the preexisting disclosure does not
just frustrate one’s ability to own a patent on it; the preexisting disclosure
precludes such ownership altogether. If I own a patent disclosing a
particular hammer, you cannot own a patent disclosing the same hammer.
But I cannot patent the hammer if it was previously disclosed. In that case,
the rights to make, use, and sell the hammer already are “owned” by the
public.
These differences do not necessarily compel departing from the
definitional approach described by management theorists. But they do
suggest that the appropriate conception of patent quality is a broad one that
takes into account both the features of patents and the inventions they
describe. Part V returns to this point.
In addition, patents’ prominent social identity suggests that when
determining which stakeholder’s views should take precedence in cases of
conflict, greater weight should be placed on the needs and preferences of
the public as opposed to manufacturers and owners. This conclusion is
consistent with the fundamental goal of the patent system, which is a
utilitarian one of promoting innovation for the benefit of the public.117 This
goal is embodied in the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S.
Constitution, which empowers Congress to provide for a system of granting
patents “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”118
113. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 545, 546 n.5 (2012) (collecting articles criticizing the prominence of disclosure
as a justification for the patent system).
114. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (requiring patented inventions to be new).
115. See id.
116. See id.; id. § 103 (requiring patented inventions to be nonobvious).
117. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1597 (2003) (“[C]ourts and commentators widely agree that the basic purpose of
patent law is utilitarian . . . .”); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law As Public Law, 20 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 41, 50 (2012) (“[A]ny benefit that patents confer on individuals is secondary
to the public’s interest in our patent system.”); Ted M. Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of
“Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 528 (2014) (“[T]here is nearly universal
agreement that the patent system’s primary goal is to promote innovation . . . .”).
118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Interpreting the Intellectual Property Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court has
consistently held that the primary purpose of the patent system is to benefit
the public.119 In 1858, for example, the Court recognized that the “true
policy and ends of the patent laws” are embodied in the Intellectual
Property Clause: “the benefit to the public or community at large was . . .
doubtless the primary object in granting and securing th[e patent]
monopoly.”120 In 1917, the Court emphasized that it had never modified its
understanding “that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the
creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is ‘to promote the
progress of science and useful arts.’”121 And in 1944, the Court succinctly
stated, “It is the public interest which is dominant in the patent system.”122
Nevertheless, the Court has consistently acknowledged that the patent
laws are intended to promote private interests in addition to public ones.123
The interests of other stakeholders are therefore still relevant to the calculus
and are included in the analysis that follows.
B. The Quality Calculus
Turning to that calculus, as a preliminary matter, it is important to be
precise about the relevant meaning of quality. As described in Part II,
quality is transcendent in nature—a matter of goodness or excellence—and
necessarily a function of objective and subjective standards. When
speaking of the quality of patents, then, the meaning used here is the one
that refers to “degree[s] of excellence,”124 where what constitutes patent
excellence depends on the views of stakeholders. In assessing a patent’s
quality, or excellence, each stakeholder necessarily emphasizes certain
attributes of the patent. These attributes—stated in management theory
terms—are a patent’s quality dimensions.
As with a product’s quality, a patent’s quality can be understood in terms
of a three-step process: first, identify the relevant stakeholders and their
shared and unique needs and preferences; second, identify the quality
dimensions that emerge from the stakeholder analysis; finally, measure a
patent’s merit with respect to each dimension and consolidate those partial
scores into a final judgment on quality. Ultimately, a particular patent’s

119. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 18 (1829) (“[T]he main object [of the patent
statute] was ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts;’ . . . .”).
120. Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328 (1858).
121. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
122. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944).
123. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731
(2002) (explaining that the patent laws attempt to maintain a balance between the interests of
inventors and the public); Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the
Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1355 (2004)
(explaining that under a utilitarian view, the patent system ideally attempts to balance all
affected interests).
124. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1858 (Philip Babcock Gove
ed., 1993).
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quality can be described as falling somewhere along a spectrum from lower
to higher quality. A simple formula that captures this calculation is:
TQ = D1 + D2 . . . .

where TQ is a patent’s total quality score, D1 is a score reflecting the
patent’s performance along dimension 1, D2 is a score reflecting the
patent’s performance along dimension 2, and so forth.
A shortcoming of this formula is that it does not take into account each
dimension’s relative importance. To represent the relative importance of
each quality dimension, a multiplier can be added to the formula as follows:
TQ = (M1)(D1) + (M2)(D2) . . . .

where M1 is a multiplier reflecting the relative importance of dimension 1,
M2 is a multiplier reflecting the relative importance of dimension 2, and so
forth.
There are several aspects of this formula that merit further description.
The first is the identity of each dimension. As with product dimensions,
patent dimensions can be better or worse proxies for patent quality; the
measurements of those dimensions reflect patent quality only to the extent
that the dimensions are good proxies for quality. If they are bad proxies,
their measurements are useless. The identities of the quality dimensions are
therefore critical to the accuracy of any judgment on patent quality.
The second variable is the patent’s performance along each dimension
and its description. Performance can be qualitatively evaluated, but
qualitative assessments cannot easily be compared or consolidated into a
final judgment on quality. The functionality of such assessments will
improve, however, if they are converted into numerical scores. Of course,
the construction of a numerical score is itself subjective. Scores can be
limited to whole numbers, or they can be presented as fractions or
percentages. Scores that are excessively fragmentized are not very
practical; scores that are insufficiently fragmentized are not very
informative.
The third variable is the multiplier for each dimension. The multiplier
reflects the dimension’s relative weight in the eyes of stakeholders, and
depending on the size of the multiplier, it can have a large influence on the
total quality score.125 But stakeholders will not necessarily agree on the
125. Consider the following hypothetical. In the baseline scenario (a), assume that the
multiplier of one dimension is twice the multiplier of the second. If the patent performs at
50 percent along both dimensions, the total quality score is 1.50 out of a total possible score
of 3.00:
(a) TQ = (1)(0.50) + (2)(0.50) = 1.50
But if the patent performs at 80 percent along only one dimension at a time, the total quality
score increases to 2.10 in (b), where the patent performs better on the more important
dimension. By comparison, in (c), it increases to only 1.80 where the patent performs better
on the less important dimension.
(b) TQ = (1)(0.50) + (2)(0.80) = 2.10
(c) TQ = (1)(0.80) + (2)(0.50) = 1.80
In sum, the total quality score increases by 40 percent when the more important dimension is
favored but only 20 percent when the less important dimension is favored. Increasing the
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size of the multiplier to assign to a particular quality dimension. One
stakeholder might view a dimension as critically important; another might
view the same dimension as trivial or even inapplicable. In order to assign
a multiplier to a particular quality dimension, then, it is necessary to
consolidate stakeholder views on the importance of that dimension. Thus,
the multiplier is actually the aggregate of individual stakeholder multipliers,
as follows:
M1 = MA + MB . . . .

where M1 is the aggregate multiplier applied to dimension 1, MA is a
multiplier reflecting the relative importance of dimension 1 to stakeholder
A, MB is a multiplier reflecting the relative importance of dimension 1 to
stakeholder B, and so forth.
It is possible that stakeholders’ views of dimension 1 will conflict,
however, further complicating the calculation of M1. One stakeholder
might assign a positive multiplier to dimension 1, indicating its preference
for the dimension, while a different stakeholder might disfavor the
dimension and assign it a negative multiplier. In cases of conflict, it is
necessary to decide whose views are controlling. As explained in Part
III.A, given the prominent social identity and purpose of patents, the
stakeholder whose views will usually be the most important in the context
of patent quality is the public.
The fourth variable is the relationship between the quality dimensions.
Some dimensions may function independently of one another so that
performance along one dimension is unrelated to performance along
another dimension. Other dimensions, however, may oppose each other so
that performance along one dimension may be achieved only at the expense
of another. Conversely, performance along one dimension may reinforce
the same performance along another dimension: success begets success,
and failure begets failure. Depending on the relationships that exist
between dimensions, they also can influence the total quality score.126
Understanding these four variables is not only critical to assessing the
quality of individual patents; it is also critical to setting a policy agenda that
multiplier of one of the dimensions to ten times that of the second widens this gap by a factor
of ten.
126. Consider the following hypothetical. In the baseline scenario (a), performance along
each dimension is independent. Assume that the patent performs at 60 percent and 40
percent along dimensions D1 and D2, respectively, and that the dimensions are equal in
importance (allowing removal of the multiplier from the equation). The total quality score is
1.00 out of a possible score of 2.00.
(a) TQ = (0.60) + (0.40) = 1.00
Now assume in (b) that the better-than-average performance of the first dimension improves
the performance of the second to 0.60. In that case, the total quality score increases 20
percent to 1.20.
(b) TQ = (0.60) + (0.60) = 1.20
But if the better-than-average performance of the first dimension decreases performance of
the second to 0.20, as in (c), then the total quality score decreases 20 percent to 0.80.
(c) TQ = (0.60) + (0.20) = 0.80
The effect of these relationships on the total quality score will be magnified if multipliers are
introduced into the equation.
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will improve the quality of the universe of patents. As in business, in
policymaking, it is simply not realistic, given scarce resources and other
practical impediments, to attempt to maximize patent quality along every
quality dimension. Even if that were possible, the marginal benefits of
setting the bar so high would likely never be worth the costs. The more
reasonable policy objective, rather, is to strive to maximize patent quality
along those dimensions—the selected quality niches—that will achieve the
largest gains at the least cost.
IV. STAKEHOLDERS IN PATENT QUALITY
While application of the formula described in the preceding section
eventually will require description of all of its variables, the next two Parts
focus on the most important of these variables: the relevant quality
dimensions. An analysis of the formula’s other variables would require far
more space than this format allows. In any event, the other variables
necessarily depend on the identities of the quality dimensions, and so it is
appropriate that the analysis begin with them.
That analysis essentially tracks the first two steps of management
theorists’ three-step approach for understanding quality in a business
context. This Part performs the first step of describing stakeholder
interests. Specifically, it describes the basic needs and preferences of four
major stakeholders in patent quality: the PTO, the courts, patentees, and the
public.
Of course, any categorization of stakeholders is subjective, and some
inevitably will disagree with the boundaries drawn here. For example,
others might subtract categories from or add categories to this list, or they
might describe these same categories with more or less granularity. In the
end, however, lines must be drawn. The lines drawn here are based on my
judgment that each of the identified group’s interests in patent quality is
both sufficiently important to merit description and sufficiently unique to
merit its own category. The assumption is that the basic quality needs and
preferences of each stakeholder are a direct function of these interests.
A. The PTO
The PTO is responsible for, among other things, examining patent
applications and issuing patents that comply with the conditions of
patentability.127
The agency is therefore deeply interested in
“manufacturing” patents consistent with its responsibilities. This is not
only a matter of institutional integrity; it is also a matter of good public
relations. The PTO has long been accused of doing a poor job of examining
patents,128 but the frequency and urgency of those complaints have
intensified in recent years.129

127. 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
128. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 1, 3–8 and accompanying text.
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In addition, the PTO is interested in reducing its workload with respect to
both patent applications and issued patents. It is frequently reported that the
PTO is understaffed, overworked, and cannot keep pace with the demand
for its services. The agency’s performance statistics in recent years seem to
bear this out. As an initial matter, the number of applications for patents
has skyrocketed, reaching over 565,000 new applications in fiscal year
2012—more than three times the number filed twenty years earlier.130 The
increased filing activity, in turn, has created a significant backlog of
pending applications. The PTO has made notable progress in reducing the
number of pending applications by, among other things, expanding its
examining corps.131 Nevertheless, the backlog of applications that have not
reached final disposition remains high at over 1.15 million by the end of
fiscal year 2012.132 The average length of pendency of a patent application
to final disposition (defined as the application’s issuance as a patent or
abandonment by the applicant) also has increased over time.133
An applicant can appeal an examiner’s final rejection of a patent
application to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), the agency’s
quasi-judicial body.134 The number of ex parte appeals pending before the
PTAB has grown exponentially to 26,570 at the end of fiscal year 2012,
more than eight times the number pending only ten years earlier.135 In
130. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 176 tbl.2.
131. The PTO currently employs almost 8,000 patent examiners (excluding design patent
examiners). Data Visualization Center: February 2014 Patents Data, at a Glance,
USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last visited Apr. 26,
2014). This represents an increase of over 2,000 examiners in a little over six years. See
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2007, at 13 (identifying 5,477 patent examiners at the end of fiscal year 2007).
132. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 130, at 177 tbl.3. Not only does the
PTO face an enormous backlog of original patent applications, but it also faces a large
backlog of requests for continued examination (RCE). An RCE is a request to continue the
examination of a patent application after prosecution of the application has closed, as when
an examiner issues a final rejection. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 1.114 (2013) (describing RCE
practice before the PTO). In early 2014, over 80,000 RCE applications were awaiting initial
action. See Data Visualization Center: February 2014 Patents Data, at a Glance, supra
note 131.
133. The average pendency in fiscal year 2012 was 32.4 months. U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 130, at 177 tbl.4. Ten years earlier, the average total
pendency was twenty-four months. Id. at 16 fig.5. In early 2014, however, the PTO was
reporting an average pendency of 28.1 months. Data Visualization Center: February 2014
Patents Data, at a Glance, supra note 131.
134. See 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) (2012). The PTAB is formerly known as the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, 125 Stat. 284 § 3(J)(1) (2011) (providing that the BPAI shall hereafter be known as
the PTAB).
135. Compare Fiscal Year 2002, Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences, Receipts and
Dispositions by Groups, Ex Parte Appeals, USPTO.GOV, http://patents.uspto.gov/ip/boards/
bpai/stats/receipts/fy2002.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (identifying 3,090 ex parte appeals
pending at the end of FY 2002), with Fiscal Year 2012, Patent Trial and Appeal Board,
Receipts and Dispositions by Technology Centers, Ex Parte Appeals, USPTO.GOV,
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/receipts/fy2012_sep_e.pdf (last visited Apr. 26,
2014). The PTO is hiring more administrative judges to hear these cases. See Gene Quinn, 9
New Administrative Patent Judges Sworn in at the USPTO, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 2, 2012),
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addition to hearing appeals of rejected applications, the PTAB also presides
over third-party challenges to the validity of issued patents and patentee
requests to reaffirm the validity of their issued patents.136 Historically,
these mechanisms have consisted of appeals of ex parte and inter partes
reexamination decisions, where reexamination is a process through which
anyone may request reopening examination of an issued patent on grounds
that there exists a “substantial new question of patentability.”137 Recently,
the America Invents Act expanded the PTAB’s responsibilities to include
presiding over still more kinds of proceedings.138
In addition to reexamining patents, the PTO is responsible for correcting
and modifying them. Among other things, it entertains requests to “reissue”
already-issued patents in circumstances where the patent’s claims are too
narrow or broad.139 The number of reissue applications filed in 2012 was
over 1,200, more than double the number filed twenty years earlier.140 The
average pendency of reissue applications has also grown significantly in
recent years.141
In sum, the PTO’s most pressing quality concerns include issuing patents
that are consistent with its institutional responsibilities and that will be a
minimal burden to it following issuance.
B. The Courts
Importantly, the PTO shares responsibility for adjudicating patent
challenges with the federal courts.142 Because the agency’s rulings are
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/02/9-new-administrative-patent-judges-sworn-in-atthe-uspto/id=22548/ (noting that nineteen new judges had been sworn in as of March 2012).
Nevertheless, some remain skeptical that hiring more judges will sufficiently address the
problem. See Dennis Crouch, BPAI Appeals Cyclic Decision Making PATENTLYJOBS (Feb.
15, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/02/bpai-appeal-decisionmaking.html.
136. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (providing that the PTAB shall preside over appeals of ex parte
reexamination decisions and conduct inter partes review and post-grant review proceedings).
137. Id. § 304 (ex parte reexamination); id. § 312(a) (Supp. IV 2010) (repealed by LeahySmith America Invents Act § 6(a), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)) (inter partes
reexamination). Although the PTO is no longer accepting requests to institute inter partes
reexamination proceedings, the PTAB must still dispose of those appealed cases that remain
pending.
138. These are post-grant review proceedings, id. §§ 321–329, inter partes review
proceedings, id. §§ 311–319, and transitional post-grant review proceedings of business
method patents, Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18.
139. See 35 U.S.C. § 251.
140. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 130, at 176 tbl.2.
141. Dennis Crouch, Reissue Patent Pendency, PATENTLYO (Jan. 23, 2011),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/reissue-patent-pendency.html (finding that reissue
application pendency had grown from a little over two years in 1990 to almost five years by
2010).
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents[ and] plant variety
protection . . . .”). More precisely, one may challenge the validity of a patent concurrently in
an administrative proceeding before the PTO and a judicial proceeding before a federal
court. See 35 U.S.C. § 315 (establishing rules for the administration of an inter partes review
proceeding and concurrently pending civil action involving the same patent); id. § 325
(establishing rules for the administration of a post-grant review proceeding and concurrently
pending civil action involving the same patent); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.565, 1.985 (2013) (requiring
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appealable to federal court, however, the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter on
patent disputes.143 Given its important and unique relationship to the patent
system, the judiciary is designated here as a distinct stakeholder, although
there is admittedly overlap of some of those interests with the interests of
the PTO and the public.
There is evidence that, like the PTO, the judiciary faces a patent-related
workload that is growing. In the fifteen-year period between 1997 and
2011, the number of patent suits filed in the federal courts almost doubled,
rising from 2,112 to 4,015.144 As a result of new joinder rules that limit the
ability of patent owners to join defendants, the number is growing ever
faster.145 Moreover, while the total number of lawsuits also increased
during this same time period, patent cases represent a steadily increasing
percentage of that total number. In 1997, patent cases represented a little
less than 0.8 percent of all lawsuits; in 2011, they represented 1.4
percent.146
Patent cases also represent a steadily increasing number of federal cases
pending for three or more years. That number more than doubled in the
fifteen-year period from 1997 to 2011, rising from 238 to 480.147 Notably,
the rate of long-pending patent cases kept rising despite significant
fluctuations in the overall number of long-pending cases during that period.
In particular, the rate of long-pending patent cases rose even during the

notification to the PTO of any concurrent litigation proceedings involving a patent at issue in
a reexamination proceeding).
143. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(a), 145 (providing that a party dissatisfied with the PTAB’s
decision rejecting any patent claims in an original examination may appeal to the Federal
Circuit or pursue a civil action against the PTO director in the Eastern District of Virginia);
id. § 141(b)–(c) (providing that a party dissatisfied with the PTAB’s decision in a
reexamination, inter partes review, or post-grant review proceeding must appeal to the
Federal Circuit).
144. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2011 tbl.C-2A (2011) (providing
statistics for the years 2007 to 2011); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2006 tbl.C-2A
(2006) (providing statistics for the years 2002 to 2006); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S.
COURTS 2001 tbl.C-2A (2001) (providing statistics for the years 1997 to 2001).
145. See New Patent Cases Filed, PATSTATS.ORG, http://patstats.org/Patstats3.html (last
updated Jan. 15, 2014) (identifying the number of patent cases filed in calendar year 2012 as
5,778, and noting that the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act’s new constraints on joinder
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 299(a)) are responsible for some but not all of the increase).
146. Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 1997 tbl.C-2A (1997) (showing
that patent suits comprised 2,112 of 272,027 total civil cases commenced in 1997), with
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2011, supra note 144, tbl.C-2A (showing that patent
suits comprised 4,015 of 289,252 total civil cases commenced in 2011).
147. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2011, supra note 144, tbl.C-12
(providing statistics for the year 2011); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2010 tbl.S11 (2010) (providing statistics for the years 2009 to 2010); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S.
COURTS 2008 tbl.S-11 (2008) (providing statistics for the years 2007 to 2008); JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2006 tbl.S-11 (2006) (providing statistics for the years 2005 to
2006); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2004 tbl.S-11 (2004) (providing statistics for
the years 2003 to 2004); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2002 tbl.S-11 (2002)
(providing statistics for the years 2001 to 2002); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS
2000 tbl.S-11 (2000) (providing statistics for the years 1999 to 2000); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE U.S. COURTS 1998 tbl.S-11 (1998) (providing statistics for the years 1997 to 1998).
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years 1999, 2006, 2007, and 2008, when the overall number of longpending cases was at its lowest.148
These trends are reason for judicial concern given that patent suits are
considered to be among the most complex types of civil cases.149 Patent
suits often involve complicated technologies, some of which require expert
assistance to explain to judges and juries.150 They also require fluency in
an elaborate web of international and domestic laws and regulations.151
The sheer number of these legal requirements and procedures has increased
exponentially over time, making the work of understanding and applying
them even more difficult.152
Moreover, patent trials are typically preceded by minitrials called
Markman hearings during which the courts interpret, or construe, the claims
at issue.153 The process of claim construction can be time-consuming, often
requiring courts to consult many sources other than the patent document to
determine claim meaning.154 And the process can be further complicated
148. See supra note 147 (identifying statistical sources).
149. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from
Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (“Patent
litigation has been called the sport of kings; it is complex, uncertain, and expensive.”);
Jennifer K. Bush et al., Six Patent Law Puzzlers, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2 (2004) (“To
call patent law complex is to call the sky blue or the ocean vast and deep. Patent law’s
complexity has long been acknowledged, and notwithstanding reform proposals aimed at
simplification, it is likely to remain complex.”); Jennifer F. Miller, Should Juries Hear
Complex Patent Cases?, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4, 29 (“Patent litigation involves some
of the most complex legal theories and underlying factual issues of any type of litigation
today.”).
150. Unlike PTAB judges, federal court judges are not required to have any technical
expertise to hear patent cases. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (requiring administrative
patent judges to be “persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability”), with Peter
Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 10 & nn.30–32 (2010) (explaining
that the number of scientifically trained district court judges is likely very low). Notably,
although the judges of the Federal Circuit are often assumed to have technical training, only
a handful of them hold scientific degrees. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard
of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 2010
(2013).
151. These include the Patent Act codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376, federal patent
regulations codified at 37 C.F.R. §§ 1–501.9, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970,
28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231, available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/
pct.pdf, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April,
15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
152. One proxy for this expansion is the Manual of Patent Examination and Procedure
(MPEP), which sets forth patent laws and rules and describes their interpretation and
application for patent examiners. The original fifth edition of the MPEP, which was
published in 1983, consisted of twenty-two chapters and was 595 pages long (excluding
appendices). MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (5th ed. 1983), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/old/mpep_E5R0.htm. The most recent eighth
edition consists of twenty-seven chapters and is almost 2,300 pages long (excluding
appendices). See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 103.
153. These hearings are named after the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc. that claim construction is a matter of law for the courts alone to
decide. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
154. Potential sources of claim meaning include dictionaries, reference materials, a
patent’s prosecution history, reports of court-appointed technical advisors or special masters,
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where the patent at issue concerns an obscure or rapidly developing
technical field or where the claims at issue use idiosyncratic terms.155
Perhaps reflecting each of these factors, patent cases have been described
by one Federal Circuit judge as “among the longest, most time-consuming
types of civil actions.”156
Of course, patent lawsuits can drag out for reasons having more to do
with the business objectives or combative nature of the litigants than with
the quality of the patents at issue. Malpractice suits may therefore be a
more reliable reflection of patent quality issues than patent lawsuits.
Although public data on prosecution-based malpractice claims is sparse,
there is some evidence that malpractice suits based on substantive drafting
errors—for example, incorrect or incomplete descriptions of inventions—
are on the rise.157
For these reasons, the judiciary’s major quality interests include both
reducing the number of patent-related disputes it is called upon to resolve
and increasing the efficiency of its resolution of those disputes.
C. Patentees
Considering patent quality from the perspective of patentees shifts the
inquiry from design and manufacturing concerns to the needs and
preferences of users. The original owner of every patent is the inventor of
what is described in the patent.158 Patent rights are alienable, however, and
inventors often assign them to other persons and entities.159 Some
and fact and expert witness testimonies regarding, inter alia, the technology at issue and
patent office procedure. See Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern
Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 800–06 (2010).
155. Guidelines for Patent Claim Construction: Post-Philips—The Basics of a Markman
Hearing, 16 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 13, 18, 26 (2006). However, courts are increasingly
implementing measures intended to reduce the complexity of the claim construction process.
See, e.g., N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 4-1(b), 4-3(c) (requiring the parties to identify the ten
“most significant” terms to be construed by the court); N.D. ILL. LPR 4.1(b) (providing a
default rule limiting the number of terms to be construed to ten). Nevertheless, a Markman
hearing can easily last a week or longer. See, e.g., Rick McDermott, Annual Intellectual
Property Law Review Banquet Speech: Lessons Learned from Fifteen Years in the Trenches
of Patent Litigation, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 471, 473 (2010) (describing a patent
litigator’s experience with Markman hearings).
156. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 629 F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Moore, J., concurring). The burden of patent litigation on the courts has long been of
interest to Judge Moore. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:
Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 933 (2001) (finding that
although patent cases represented only 0.57 percent of the annual civil caseload in district
courts between 1983 and 1999, they represented 9.4 percent of all civil cases requiring
twenty or more days of trial).
157. See Christi J. Guerrini, The Decline of the Patent Registration Exam, 91 NEB. L.
REV. 325, 372 nn.263–66 (2012).
158. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating
that the ownership of a patent initially vests in the named inventors of the invention
described in the patent); see also Isr. Bio-Engineering Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d
1256, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“It is a bedrock tenet of patent law that ‘an invention
presumptively belongs to its creator.’” (quoting Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83
F.3d 403, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1996))).
159. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (providing that patents and applications can be assigned).
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assignees will pay dearly for those rights if they wish to practice the
patented invention or control the rights of others to do so.
While patents can be valuable to their owners because the inventions they
protect are commercially successful, they also can have value as business
assets independent of their underlying inventions. Because the economic
value of a creation depends in part on the legal rights that attach to it, every
patent has value by virtue of the rights of exclusion that its owner enjoys.160
Patentees can monetize these rights by, among other things, constructing
large portfolios that they can then license or use strategically for offensive
or defensive purposes.161 Indeed, in some industries, competition within
the patent space is fierce, with each participant stockpiling patents in what
has been described as an escalating “intellectual-property arms race.”162
Patentees also can derive value from their patents by using them as
deterrents to competitors and signals to consumers.163
But an invalid patent is not enforceable. Although invalid patents can be
used as a means to limit competition, charge supranormal prices, obtain
licensing fees, and attract capital, one’s ability to engage in those activities
will last only so long as the patents go unchallenged. Once challenged, an
invalid patent may have negative value if unsuccessfully defended.164 All
things being equal, then, patentees prefer that their patents be enforceable.
160. See Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed To Promote?: Defining “Progress”
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the
Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 789 (2001). Admittedly, in some cases, that value
may be negligible.
161. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300, 326–32
(2010) (describing the various ways in which firms can use patents offensively and
defensively).
162. Sam Gustin, Patent Progress: What Apple and HTC’s Landmark Pact Means for the
Patent Wars, TIME (Nov. 12, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/11/12/patent-perestroikawhat-apple-and-htcs-landmark-pact-means-for-the-patent-wars/; see also The Arms Race:
Companies Are Preparing for the Intellectual-Property Battle, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL
REPORT), Oct. 22, 2005, at 6, 8 (interviewing industry insiders who describe how companies
today are building up patent portfolios (“nukes pointing at each other”), demanding royalties,
and enforcing patent rights in court because, as explained by one German software
executive, “These are the rules of the game!”). Perhaps exemplifying this trend, in 2011,
Apple and Google for the first time spent more on patent purchases and intellectual property
litigation than they did on research and development. See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The
Patent, Used As a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at A1.
163. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 655–58 (2002) (explaining the
communication function of patents as a means of credibly publicizing information to the
marketplace).
164. In 2011, the cost of patent litigation was estimated to be $5 million for a case worth
more than $25 million. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 2011, at 35 (2011). These costs are between two and three times higher than those
for other kinds of intellectual property litigation. See id. at 35–36 (reporting the median
estimated cost of trade secret misappropriation, trademark, and copyright cases with more
than $25 million at risk as, respectively, $2.5 million, $1.5 million, and $1.375 million); see
also THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE
PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF
COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 38–39 (1997) (finding, based on a nationwide
survey of attorneys, that patent cases are among those civil cases having the highest
discovery expenses).
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Patentees also prefer that the rights of exclusion that attach to their
patents be broad. Broad rights can be achieved in two ways. First, broad
rights attach to “flexible” claims that can be interpreted in various ways to
fit the circumstances.165 In order for a claim to achieve maximum coverage
of infringing activity, it must anticipate the technological changes that will
occur during the time lag between the issuance of a patent and its
interpretation in an adversarial proceeding.166 This is accomplished by
writing claims in vague terms that can bend in response to the patentee’s
changing circumstances.167
But broad rights can also attach to unambiguous claims when they are
drafted such that their boundaries push up against, and arguably even
exceed, what was actually invented.168 Broadly drafted claims expand the
scope of conduct that is deemed infringing, while narrowly drafted claims
limit that scope and therefore the universe of potential infringers.169
In sum, patentees’ most pressing quality interests are in patents that
represent maximum value to them, where a patent’s value will usually be a
function of the unique business circumstances of its owner and the nature of
both the invention that the patent describes and the patent’s description of
that invention.
D. The Public
As explained in Part III, the primary goal of the patent system is a
utilitarian one of promoting invention for the benefit of the public.170
Excluding patentees from this population, for any given patent, the public
includes individuals who are metaphorically so far away from the patent
that they are unlikely to ever be accused of infringing it, as well as
competitors who are metaphorically close to the patent and either seek to
practice the patented invention or avoid practicing (and being accused of
infringing) it. The quality interests of these individuals are aligned,
although in specific cases they will likely vary in intensity depending on
one’s distance from a particular patent.
Ideally, each patent application would be evaluated to determine whether
granting the applicant an exclusive right to limit access to potentially
important innovations is worth it from a welfare perspective.171 That
165. Wagner, supra note 1, at 2148–51.
166. See id.
167. See id. at 2149. Patentees’ preference for vague claims that introduce uncertainty
about claim scope and meaning is also discussed in R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering
Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 216
(2002).
168. Wagner, supra note 167, at 216.
169. See Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Patent Incentives 8–13 (Dec.
20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2147491
(explaining the trade-off between narrow and broad claims for validity and infringement
analyses).
170. See supra notes 117–22 and accompanying text.
171. See Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 741
(2012).
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evaluation, however, would be prohibitively expensive.172 In its place,
Congress has codified the standards of patentability to distinguish those
applications that should issue as patents from those that should be rejected
in a manner that is consistent with the goals of the patent system.173
If the standards of patentability are properly calibrated to minimize costs
and maximize benefits, then the public strongly prefers patents that satisfy
those conditions. This assumes, however, that the standards themselves are
correctly applied. Congress establishes the standards of patentability and
the PTO and courts interpret and apply them to particular cases, in the
process providing further definition to the standards. Even if the standards
are properly calibrated, if they are incorrectly applied, some issued patents
will presumably reflect an imbalance of costs and benefits.
That the conditions of patentability are properly calibrated and applied is
important to the public for the additional reason that infringement of a
patent is a strict liability offense.174 This means that one may be liable for
infringing a patent regardless of intent to infringe and regardless even of
knowledge of the patent.175 The public, which consists of potential
infringers, must therefore avoid practicing the inventions protected by
patents or else risk a charge of infringement. With respect to paradigmatic
patented items like mechanical widgets, most people are metaphorically so
far away from the invention that their legal duties with respect to it are
irrelevant.176 But patent law has expanded over the decades to include
nonparadigmatic items, such as business methods and sports moves.177
Given the generalized nature of many of these items, the class of persons
likely to infringe includes a much larger subset of the population.178 With
respect especially to patents on nonparadigmatic items, it is important to the
public that they are worth their compliance costs.179
Moreover, it is important that all patents be understandable to interested
persons so that they may decide whether or not to comply, and when they
choose to comply, that they know how to do so. It is also generally easier
to justify the costs of complying with patents that describe socially useful
inventions.180 Although some patents describe such inventions, there is no

172. See id.
173. See id. at 741–42.
174. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
175. See, e.g., Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968)
(“[A]n infringement may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional and without knowledge of
the patent.”).
176. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 491
(2004).
177. See id. at 507, 536, 541.
178. See id. at 487–88.
179. See id. at 468 (explaining that nonowners, or “observers,” must “cognize and
mentally process at least enough information to determine where the boundaries of
protection lie so as to fulfill their legal duties of avoiding infringement”).
180. See Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57,
64 (2011) (“An invention’s usefulness indicates social welfare; when an invention is useless,
society reaps no benefit.”).
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requirement that they do so.181 Consequently, many inventors file patent
applications before they can tell whether their inventions will satisfy any
public need. This is good if the aim of the patent system is to encourage the
prompt dissemination of ideas, but it is bad from the perspective of the
public to the extent that it increases the number of patents with which the
public must comply without providing offsetting welfare benefits.
The public also includes taxpayers who are interested in the efficient
administration of the patent system. That is because the patent system
relies in part on public funds for its operation and enforcement. The PTO is
user-fee funded;182 its efficient operation is therefore of primary interest to
patentees. The judicial system, however, is largely funded by the public.183
The public therefore shares the concerns of the judiciary described in the
preceding subsection.
For the public, however, these concerns are tempered by the potential
social benefit of patent challenges. A ruling that a patent is invalid
enhances social welfare because the ruling effectively returns information
to the public domain that never should have been removed from it.184 If
patent challenges are more likely to involve valuable inventions, as some
have suggested,185 their social benefit might be substantial. It is one thing
to improperly exclude information from the public domain that everyone
agrees is trivial or worthless. It is another to improperly exclude
information that others would benefit from using.
Of course, not every patent challenge concludes with an invalidity
ruling.186 Moreover, some patents are invalidated based on obscure
references that never would have been located but for the efforts of adverse

181. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75,
78 (2005).
182. Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure To Expand
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 407 & n.107 (2011) (stating that “[t]he PTO is
a self-funded agency that obtains its entire budget through user fees” and “the PTO[’s]
budget is set to the amount of [its] projected revenue”).
183. Julia S. Gibbons, How the Judiciary Gets Its Funding, FED. LAW., Oct. 2009, at 30
(explaining the process by which the federal judiciary applies to Congress for its funding).
184. See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for
Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 688 (2004) (“A court judgment that a
patent claim is invalid is a public good.”).
185. To date, there are no empirical studies investigating a connection between valuable
inventions and the litigation rates of patents covering such inventions, but an understanding
that such a link exists seems reasonable. See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 149, at 21
(“[V]aluable inventions are more likely to be litigated . . . .”); Stephen T. Schreiner &
Patrick A. Doody, Patent Continuation Applications: How the PTO’s Proposed New Rules
Undermine an Important Part of the U.S. Patent System with Hundreds of Years of History,
88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 556, 561 n.21 (2006) (“[I]t is reasonable to expect that
patents on significant inventions are more likely to be litigated.”). Valuable inventions are to
be contrasted with valuable patents, whose litigation rates have been empirically studied. See
generally John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004).
186. Although the number of patents that are invalidated during litigation is surprisingly
high, approximately half of claims are still affirmed as valid when challenged in court. See
supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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parties.187 It is difficult to say that invalidating an otherwise valid patent on
the basis of a paper tucked away in a foreign library does the public a
service that justifies its costs. In the end, it is uncertain whether patent
challenges do more social harm than good and so are worth the public funds
that subsidize some of them. Nevertheless, a consideration of these
challenges’ costs and benefits is at least useful for underscoring the
significance to the public of their efficient and proper resolution.
In general, the public is powerfully interested in maintaining a balanced
patent system that protects patented inventions—especially those that are
socially useful—where doing so justifies the costs of compliance and
monopoly and where affected bystanders can know what constitutes
compliant conduct. Further, the public is interested in the efficient
administration of the judicial system, especially with respect to both
invalidating patents that never should have issued and upholding patents
that merit protection.
V. DIMENSIONS OF PATENT QUALITY
The foregoing analysis of stakeholder preferences reveals certain features
or dimensions related to patents that are relevant to the question of patent
quality’s meaning. Described in detail below, they are: (1) a patent’s
probable validity; (2) clarity of the patent; (3) faithfulness of the patent to
the scope of the underlying invention; (4) social utility of the invention; and
(5) commercial success of the invention.
The dimensions of probable validity, clarity, and faithfulness focus on
the patent document, while the dimensions of social utility and commercial
success focus on the invention described in the patent. In other words,
patent quality is a function of both the patent as an informational document
and legal instrument and its underlying invention as a thing that operates in
the real world. Consistent with the discussion in Part III.A, both patentbased and invention-based dimensions are included in an understanding of
patent quality as a result of the difficulty of disentangling the quality of an
invention from the quality of a patent that is intended to capture the
invention.
In describing each dimension, this Part summarizes each stakeholder’s
preference (or not) for that dimension. Beyond the earlier observation that
the public interest generally should take precedence in cases of conflict,188
however, it makes no attempt to weigh or balance competing interests. This
Part also explains the relationships between specific dimensions where
doing so is necessary to distinguish them. But it does not attempt to work
out the many ways in which the dimensions positively and negatively
reinforce one another. Again, the objective is to identify the dimensions on
which these other variables depend, and in so doing, to lay the groundwork
for further analysis.
187. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899–900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that a single copy of
a thesis indexed in one German library constituted invalidating prior art).
188. See supra Part III.A.
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A. Probable Validity
The first quality dimension is legal validity, or a patent’s conformance
with the standards of patentability. In theory, valid patent claims embody
the patent system’s compromise between the benefits of increased
innovation and its disclosure and the costs of monopoly and compliance.
As explained by Federal Circuit Judge Pauline Newman, “The question of
patent quality requires a threshold focus on the standard by which quality is
measured, which in turn is determined by the purpose of a system of
patents. . . . The quality of a patent is measured by how effectively it fulfils
that purpose.”189 A patent’s validity is therefore a good proxy for its
quality where the conditions of patentability correctly distinguish patents
that fulfill the purpose of the patent system.
This does not mean, however, that the legal standards are only relevant to
patent quality where the standards are perfectly calibrated to make that
distinction. As an initial matter, perfect calibration likely could never be
achieved given the myriad influences on the interpretation and application
of those standards in specific cases. In any event, it seems clear that,
whatever the substance of the legal standards, stakeholders associate patents
that meet those standards with good quality for the reason that they promote
the efficient conduct of all who encounter them.
The PTO, for one, associates valid patent claims with good patent quality
because issuing such claims is consistent with its institutional mission, and
patentees prefer such claims because exclusionary rights attach to valid
claims but not invalid ones. Moreover, the PTO, the courts, and the public
prefer valid patents for the additional reason that rational persons accused
of infringing them will not go to the expense of challenging their
validity.190 Accused infringers are less likely to pursue a challenge that
they will surely lose than they are to quickly settle the case and spend any
excess funds on research and development and other socially useful
activities.191
Importantly, these behavioral predictions assume that a patent’s validity
can be observed. In reality, however, a patent’s validity can never be
certain. That is because a claim’s presumption of validity can be
challenged, and such challenges are in fact frequently successful.192 There
are a number of rules that contribute to this outcome. For one, courts
189. Pauline Newman, Panel Contribution, in Adams, supra note 4, at 62.
190. See supra note 164 (describing the high costs of patent litigation).
191. On the other hand, rational owners of invalid claims will not press them in an
adversarial proceeding but instead will attempt to license the claims at a cost that is lower
than anticipated litigation expenses. See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee
Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 370–71 (2012) (describing this
well-known (and much-maligned) tactic of certain nonpracticing entities). Rational persons
accused of infringing an invalid patent claim will accept this deal, albeit unhappily, because
it makes economic sense to do so. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 181, at 88–89. In
addition, there is a public good problem that discourages persons accused of infringing a
patent claim from challenging it in court: rivals will benefit from a finding that the claim is
invalid but will pay nothing to obtain that benefit. See id. at 88–90.
192. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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determine validity from the perspective of the person having ordinary skill
in the art (known as the PHOSITA), and unlike any real person, the
PHOSITA is endowed with knowledge of all relevant technology, known as
“prior art” references.193 In practice, the determination of the relevant art in
which the PHOSITA is deemed to have ordinary skill is relatively fluid and
therefore subject to manipulation.194 Moreover, the universe of prior art
can be broadly construed to include publications that are known by only a
few persons in the world.195 Defendants have every incentive to unearth
such references and argue for their inclusion in the universe of relevant
prior art.196 Further, new defendants are not collaterally estopped from
attacking a patent claim’s validity,197 and because historical information
about the state of the art is continuously surfacing,198 new defendants may
be successful in invalidating claims where others had failed.
As a result of these rules, the validity of patent claims is never truly
final.199 It is therefore less accurate to refer to a claim as valid or invalid
than it is to refer to a claim’s probability of being held valid or not if
challenged.200
But is it even possible to calculate a particular claim’s probability of
validity? Anecdotally, at least some members of the patent community
assert that they can identify when a patent claim is particularly strong,201
and scholars routinely assume that the validity of some claims is selfevident.202 This commentary suggests that at least some claims are being
193. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1188 (2002).
194. See id. at 1189 (“[T]he parameters of the art are subject to fluctuation, and thus so is
the size and depth of the library of references with which the PHOSITA is presumed to be
familiar.”).
195. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
196. At least some members of the patent bar believe that developing such proof is only a
matter of time and resources. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 191, at 371 (quoting a plaintiffs’
lawyer’s explanation that “[t]he more a patent is litigated, it tends to decrease in value as
people come up with better prior art or over-analyze the thing”).
197. This is the rule of nonmutual issue preclusion announced in Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
198. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 46, at 55 (explaining that objective evidence of
validity issues like obviousness come to light over time).
199. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 181, at 75 (asserting that a patent right is not a
guarantee of a right of exclusion but rather is a legal right to try to exclude).
200. Cf. Graf, supra note 9, at 499–500 (noting that some commentators define patent
quality not in terms of validity but rather in terms of certainty of validity).
201. See, e.g., Russ Krajec, Can Patent Quality Be Measured?, ANYTHING UNDER THE
SUN MADE BY MAN, http://www.krajec.com/blog/can-patent-quality-be-measured (last
visited Apr. 26, 2014) (stating that most patent prosecutors claim that they know good patent
quality when they see it and that some are “really good, and some not so good”). It is fair to
assume, however, that such assessments are made without regard to invalidating “secret”
prior art.
202. See, e.g., Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 46, at 58 (asserting that a “clearly valid”
patent does not much benefit from a validity presumption); Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation,
121 YALE L.J. 470, 514 (2011) (explaining that “obviously” valid and invalid patents are
usually settled before trial); Note, Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV.
840, 856 (1960) (stating the desirability of deterring infringement of “obviously valid”
patents).
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identified as probably valid as a matter of course. Recently, empirical
studies have sought to identify ways to validate these intuitive
judgments.203 As more data is gathered and studies are performed, it may
soon become possible to calculate a patent’s probable validity with some
degree of accuracy.204
B. Clarity
The second quality dimension is patent clarity. The correct interpretation
of patents is a notoriously difficult task given, among other things, the
inherent impossibility of words to describe things,205 the technical jargon
and “patent-ese” that infuse patents,206 and the patentee’s lexicographical
right to invent new words and provide new definitions for existing
words.207 And the task is made no easier by the lack of a stable analytic
framework to guide judges in the claim construction process.208
Consequently, it is not uncommon for a court’s construction of claim terms
to be reversed when appealed to the Federal Circuit. One study found that
38 percent of district court cases appealed between 1996 and 2007 included
at least one wrongly construed term.209
Although some of the problems associated with claim construction are
unavoidable, a patent can do a better or worse job of describing its
underlying invention. This avoidable ambiguity makes it difficult for
readers of a patent to understand the invention and reliably predict whether
the PTO, the courts, and third parties will take a similar view of the
meaning of claim terms.
The patent statute includes a patentability condition known as the
definiteness requirement that is intended to ensure a minimum level of
clarity for all patents.210 The definiteness requirement provides that claims
must “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter

203. One such study, for example, found that certain prosecution events and facial
features of patents, including the degree of match between a patent’s specification and its
claims, are strongly correlated with validity rulings. See Mann & Underweiser, supra note 1,
at 29–30.
204. These calculations, however, must necessarily include a discount for those legal
rules that allow patents to be invalidated for unpredictable reasons, such as the unearthing of
obscure prior art. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
205. See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (stating
that converting physical inventions to words “allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot
be satisfactorily filled,” because the invention is new and words do not yet exist to describe
it).
206. Richard P. Beem, The Abraham Lincoln School of Patent Litigation, 19 PRAC.
LITIGATOR, May 2008, at 59, 62 (“Do patents really need to be translated into plain English?
. . . Perhaps no other practice has incurred the wrath of the courts so much as the use of
complicated technical language, or ‘patentese.’”).
207. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
208. Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 46, at 57 (explaining that the interpretive rules
under which patent claims are analyzed are “constantly in flux”).
209. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 240 (2008).
210. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
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which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”211 A patent
claim is sufficiently definite so long as it is capable of interpretation, even
though the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons
disagree.212 It is only the “insolubly ambiguous” claim that will be held
indefinite.213 Applying these rules, claims are invalidated for indefiniteness
in only the most egregious circumstances, such as where the meaning of a
term depends entirely on a person’s subjective opinion.214 Because the
definiteness requirement sets a low bar, the dimension of clarity refers to
clarity exceeding what is currently required by the definiteness standards of
patentability.
Unlike the dimension of validity, the interests of stakeholders are not
aligned on the dimension of clarity. While patentees do not prefer patents
that are particularly explicit,215 the PTO, the courts, and the public associate
patent clarity with good quality because unambiguous patents are more
easily construed than ambiguous ones. Unambiguous patents also promote
a purpose of the patent system: to promote the disclosure of innovation.216
A patent’s disclosure is incomplete and cannot induce further innovation
where those in the relevant technical fields cannot understand it.
Ambiguous patents also fail to inform others of their protected boundaries.
As a result, third parties may invest in working within those boundaries,
which is unlawful and also potentially wasteful, or decline to invest in
working near but outside of those boundaries under the mistaken belief that
the area is protected.217 Further, those who may wish to practice the
invention are unable to make informed decisions about whether to license
or purchase it, file a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate it, or
roll the dice with a lawsuit and infringe it. And those who wish to avoid

211. Id.
212. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (interpreting the term “surrender value protected investment credits,” which was not
defined in the patent or in any industry publication, to be synonymous with “stable value
protected investment credits,” even though the patent used the different terms in different
ways that suggested they had different meanings, and ultimately holding the claim
sufficiently definite (emphasis added)), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Bancorp Servs.,
L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
213. Id. Where the question of indefiniteness is a close one, it is resolved in favor of
validity. See id. (citing Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1380
(2001)).
214. For instance, the Federal Circuit has invalidated for indefiniteness a claim using the
term “aesthetically pleasing,” which the court viewed as “completely dependent on a
person’s subjective opinion.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342,
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Claims using terms such as “substantially” and “close to,” however,
are routinely upheld as definite. See Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elec., Inc., 847 F.2d 819, 821
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
215. See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.
216. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966) (“It is true, of course, that one of
the purposes of the patent system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning
discoveries and inventions.”).
217. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 278 (1977) (explaining that patents allow competitors to inform each other of
their innovations, thus reducing duplicative investment in work already done).
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practicing the invention cannot make informed decisions about how to work
around it.218
C. Faithfulness
Closely related to the dimension of clarity is faithfulness. The claims of
a patent are analogous to the “metes and bounds” of a real property deed
that “distinguish the inventor’s intellectual property from the surrounding
terrain.”219 In this way, the “claims establish a “conceptual perimeter
around the invention.”220 This conceptual perimeter is known as claim
scope.221
A patent’s faithfulness refers to whether its claims completely and
accurately describe—or are “faithful” to—the scope of the underlying
invention. A faithful claim is congruent with the scope of its underlying
invention. An unfaithful claim, on the other hand, captures something
more, less, or different than what was actually invented. So described, the
faithfulness dimension encompasses three problematic scenarios:
overbroad scope, overnarrow scope, and otherwise inaccurate scope.
Claims that are overbroad assert rights to something more than what was
actually invented. An example of overclaiming can be found in In re
Wright,222 which involved a claim on a vaccine on all pathogenic RNA
viruses, where the only invention disclosed in the patent was a vaccine that
conferred immunity in chickens against one type of RNA tumor virus. 223 It
is fundamental to American patent law that there is no patent protection for
something that was not invented.224 This prohibition is reflected in multiple
patent law doctrines, including the enablement and written description
requirements of patentability. These requirements focus on a patent’s
specification, which is considered relevant to claim scope as a result of the
maxim that a PHOSITA is deemed to read claims in the context of the
entire patent.225 The enablement doctrine requires that the specification
describe “the manner and process of making and using” the disclosed

218. To work around a patent is to “achieve the technological benefits of the patent
without duplicating the particular steps constituting it and thus without infringement.”
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 295 (2003).
219. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 845 (1990).
220. Timothy Chen Saulsbury, Pioneers Versus Improvers: Enabling Optimal Patent
Claim Scope, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 439, 445 (2010).
221. Id.
222. 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
223. Id. at 1560–62.
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to grant patent rights to
inventors); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (limiting the grant of patent rights to those who are
inventors); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the
Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1178 (2004) (“It is fundamental to
American patent law that patentees are not entitled to protection for what they either did not
invent or did not disclose to the public.”).
225. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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invention.226 The written description doctrine requires that the specification
allow PHOSITAs to recognize that the inventor invented what is
claimed.227
In practice, neither doctrine has managed to eliminate the problem of
overbroad claims. The enablement doctrine has traditionally been limited
to the so-called unpredictable arts—e.g., life sciences and chemicals.228
Meanwhile, the written description requirement has traditionally been
limited to preventing late claiming of new matter.229 In any event, as
explained by one scholar, both doctrines are “confusing and badly
fractured.”230 As a result, traditional scope-limiting patent doctrines and
practices are unable to reach every instance of overclaiming. Moreover,
they only come into play when a claim is challenged.231
While the problems of overbroad claims are well documented, those
associated with underclaiming and otherwise inaccurate claiming generally
receive less attention. But that was not always the case. Indeed, the
practice of underclaiming and erroneous claiming by unscrupulous patent
prosecutors was a source of intense public concern in the late 1800s and
early 1900s.232 And it was partly in response to the perceived proliferation
of these kinds of patents that Congress and the PTO established a regulatory
system—unique in all of administrative law—that restricts who may
prosecute patents.233
Although this regulatory system helped curb the most egregious
professional abuses, mistakes persist.
An example of erroneous
underclaiming234 is the case of Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski,
LLP,235 which involved an extra limitation in a claim that rendered it so
narrow as to be practically worthless.236 Mistakes of otherwise inaccurate
claiming also occur. An example is the case of Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb226. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
227. Id. (requiring a written description); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d
1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (interpreting the statutory requirement).
228. See Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming
2014).
229. See id. (manuscript at 19 n.83).
230. Id. (manuscript at 17).
231. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 1501 (estimating that roughly 2 percent of all patents
are ever litigated, and less than two-tenths of 1 percent of all issued patents actually go to
court).
232. See Guerrini, supra note 157, at 332–37 (2012) (describing the growing chorus of
disapproval of prosecution practices that were believed to rob inventors of the full scope of
the patent rights to which they were entitled); Kara W. Swanson, The Emergence of the
Professional Patent Practitioner, 50 TECH. & CULTURE 519, 529–30 (2009) (same).
233. See Guerrini, supra note 157, at 331–38.
234. To be clear, the attribute of underbreadth described in this Article is limited to
instances of unintentional underclaiming. It does not address instances of intentional
underclaiming. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 556
(2010) (explaining that some patentees intentionally underclaim in order to dedicate subject
matter to the public).
235. 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
236. Specifically, the claim at issue described the invention as “consisting of” certain
elements, where “consisting of” in patent law means limited only to these elements, although
the invention was not in fact limited to those elements. See id. at 1283.
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Weston, Inc.,237 which involved a claim for producing a light and flaky
crust.238 The claim mistakenly required heating the dough, rather than the
oven, to a temperature of 400°F to 850°F, which would have caused the
dough to burn to a crisp.239
Procedures exist to correct errors of underclaiming and inaccurate
claiming. For one, patentees may broaden overnarrow claims during
reissue proceedings at the PTO.240 However, broadening reissues must be
sought within two years of the grant of the patent,241 and reissued material
is effective in some cases only as to causes of action arising after the
reissuance date.242 Minor drafting mistakes may be corrected via
certificates of correction, but a correction certification also has a delayed
effective date.243 Otherwise, the mismatch between claim scope and
invention scope can be corrected through judicial claim construction.244
But the courts are not always so helpful when they interpret claims.245
As with the clarity dimension, stakeholder interests are not aligned on the
faithfulness dimension. Overbroad claims expand the scope of conduct that
is deemed infringing, and so long as they avoid invalidating prior art and
otherwise go unchallenged, patentees associate them with good patent
quality.246 But patentees disfavor overnarrow and otherwise inaccurate
claims because the rights that attach to them are less than or different from
those that would attach to the true invention. Meanwhile, the PTO, the
courts, and the public disfavor all instances where claim scope does not
match the true scope of the underlying invention claims. Aside from the
likely invalidity of such claims, these stakeholders would prefer to reduce

237. 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
238. Id. at 1372.
239. Id. at 1373–74.
240. 35 U.S.C. §§ 251–252 (2012). The proceeding is also available to narrow the scope
of a claim as a result of overclaiming. See id.
241. Id. § 251(d). As illustrated in the Immunocept case, some errors of underclaiming
are not identified within this two-year period and so remain uncorrected. Immunocept, 504
F.3d at 1283 (explaining that the patent issued in 1996, but the drafting error was not
discovered until 2002, long after the two-year window had closed).
242. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (providing that a reissued patent can be enforced against infringing
activity that occurred from the time the original patent was issued only if the claims of the
original and reissue patents are “substantially identical”). Moreover, persons who practice
the reissued patent may have intervening rights that are a defense to patent infringement. See
id. (codifying the defenses of absolute and equitable intervening rights).
243. 35 U.S.C. § 255 (providing that the corrected patent is effective only as to causes of
action arising after the correction). For causes of action arising before that date, the patent
must be considered without the benefit of the correction. Novo Indus. v. Micro Molds Corp.,
350 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
244. See Menell et al., supra note 154, at 770–72 (describing courts’ authority to correct
mistakes in patents through the claim construction process and providing examples).
245. See, e.g., Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (construing a claim for producing a light and flaky crust that required heating the
dough “to a temperature in the range of about 400°F to 850°F” to refer to dough temperature
rather than oven temperature even though that construction produced the nonsensical result
that the dough would be burned to a crisp (emphasis omitted)).
246. See generally Yelderman, supra note 169.
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the instances in which patentees call upon the PTO and courts to correct
scope issues and adjudicate malpractice disputes.
Further, the public has agreed to give patentees rights of exclusion to
exactly—and only—what was actually invented. Overbroad claims exclude
the public from technological spaces in which they otherwise might freely
be able to move. Overbroad claims also can have a chilling effect on those
who would otherwise be inclined to investigate related forms of the
invention that the patentee did not actually invent.247 Overnarrow and
otherwise inaccurate claims, on the other hand, cheat the patentee of certain
rights of exclusion to which she is entitled, which is demoralizing and may
discourage her from innovating in the future or from disclosing her
inventions to the public.
D. Social Utility
Moving from the patent document to its underlying invention, the fourth
dimension is the social utility of the invention. There are two general
sources of social utility: the nature of the invention and the technological
progress represented by the invention. The nature of an invention can be
such that its social utility is obvious; the discovery of a cure for a lifethreatening disease that afflicts a large population, for example, is clearly
beneficial to society. The social utility of other inventions, however, is
more elusive; the patent on eyeglasses that attach to eyebrow piercings
comes to mind.248
Distinct from the nature of an invention is the technological progress that
it represents.
“The patent system is a regime of technological
evaluation”;249 that evaluation can and often does include a judgment that
the invention described in a patent represents a revolutionary technological
advance or, as is usually the case, a modest improvement over the existing
technology.250 Such inventions are called, respectively, pioneers and
improvements.251 Frequently cited examples of pioneer inventions are the
sewing machine invented by Elias Howe, Jr., the electrical telegraph
invented by Samuel Morse, and the telephone invented by Alexander
Graham Bell.252
There is a general consensus that pioneer inventions are crucial to the sort
of technological advance that the patent system is designed to encourage.
Because pioneer inventions have the most significant impact on society,
“[t]hey are the inventions with which we are most familiar, and those we
247. Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 158 (2006).
248. U.S. Patent No. 6,557,994 B1 (filed July 18, 2002).
249. John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10
HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 36 (1995).
250. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561–62 (1898) (defining a
pioneer patent as one “covering a function never before performed, a wholly novel device, or
one of such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art, as
distinguished from a mere improvement or perfection of what had gone before”).
251. Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 393
(2012).
252. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 562.
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care most about.”253 In other words, pioneer inventions have outsized
social utility.
All patented inventions must have some utility in order to satisfy the
utility standard of patentability,254 but the bar set by that standard is
exceptionally low.255 All patented inventions must also be nonobvious, but
the bar set by that standard also can be low and, according to some, is not
consistently applied.256 A patented pioneer invention’s usefulness to
society far exceeds what is required by law, and for this reason, the public
associates it with good patent quality.257
While the PTO and courts may be neutral with respect to utility derived
solely from the nature of an invention since that utility does not necessarily
impact their functions, patentees associate patents on socially important
inventions with good patent quality to the extent that they translate into
money or power in the marketplace. With respect to utility derived from an
invention’s technological progress, the opinions of these stakeholders may
be stronger. With pioneer inventions, there is little to no prior art that must
be avoided and so patents on them are typically broad in scope.258
Patentees therefore associate such patented inventions with good patent
quality because they allow for greater operational freedom and competitive
leverage than do typical improvement patents. Relatedly, the PTO and the
courts may favor pioneer inventions because validity issues relating to
patents on these inventions may take less time and resources to resolve, as
there are fewer prior art references to consider.259 On the other hand,

253. Thomas, supra note 249, at 37.
254. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (requiring patented inventions to be “useful”).
255. That standard requires patented inventions to “operate as described and potentially
provide some de minimis public benefit.” See Risch, supra note 180, at 58.
256. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity: The Supreme Court’s
Failure To Define Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in KSR v. Teleflex, 12 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 323, 324 (2008) (explaining that obviousness decisions are “inconsistent
and unpredictable”); Gregory R. Baden, Note, Third-Party Assistance in Determining
Obviousness, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1213–14 (2011) (proposing a third-party obviousness
specialist to bring greater consistency to the obviousness determination).
257. There is, however, some disagreement as to the proper scope of patent rights that
should attach to pioneer inventions. Robert Merges and Richard Nelson have argued that in
many industries, the efficiency gains from granting broad patent protection to pioneer
inventions are likely outweighed by the loss of competition for improvements of those
inventions. Merges & Nelson, supra note 219, at 843–44. The patent laws should therefore
“attempt at the margin to favor a competitive environment for improvements.” Id. at 843.
Other scholars have argued that expanding the scope of protection afforded to patents on
pioneer inventions is appropriate given, among other things, the steep refinement costs and
high risks associated with such inventions. See Love, supra note 251, at 405.
258. See Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., 181 F.3d 1291, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“[P]ioneers acquire broader claims than non-pioneers who must craft narrow claims to
evade the strictures of a crowded art field.”); Love, supra note 251, at 417 (explaining that
pioneer inventions can be claimed using broad language, because they “open up new fields
in which little or no prior art exists”).
259. Cf. Love, supra note 251, at 426–27 (explaining the claim that the PTO is unlikely to
reject applications on pioneer invention claims on grounds of validity because there are so
few prior art patents to consider).
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because the field being described is entirely new, it may be more difficult to
interpret such patents.260
E. Commercial Success
Inventions can have commercial value distinct from their social utility.
For example, an invention that is selected as an industry standard may have
a commercial value that far exceeds its technological achievement. In the
setting of industry standards, there are usually alternatives from which to
choose, although the technological differences between them may be
insignificant.261 Yet the selected solution will have much greater
commercial value than the rejected solutions by virtue of its identification
as the standard. And if that solution is patented, the patentee will be able to
extract supranormal royalties from industry participants who seek to—
indeed, must—use it.262
Conversely, a new orphan drug to treat a rare medical disease may be
extraordinarily valuable to those affected by the disease. But by virtue of
the small size of that population, such drugs will in many cases be
unprofitable in the absence of government intervention.263 On the other end
of the spectrum are inventions that have no market at all. The oncepatented “beerbrella” to shade one’s cold beverage on a sunny day, for
instance, is an oft-cited example of an invention having no commercial
viability.264 Notably, the beerbrella may exemplify the rule rather than the
exception; 50 percent or more of all patented inventions in the United States
are likely never commercially exploited.265
There is currently no requirement in patent law that a patented invention
be commercially significant. To the contrary, the patent system embraces
the fact that some patented inventions will have no commercial value by,
among other things, encouraging the early filing of patents before a market
260. See id. at 410–11 (explaining the PTO’s potential difficulty in understanding pioneer
inventions due to the limitations of language in describing something that is entirely new).
261. Patrick J. Flinn, Why FRAND Matters, 25 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 8, 9 (2013).
262. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2007).
263. The Orphan Drug Act of 1983 incentivizes the development of orphan drugs. See
Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified in scattered sections of
21, 26, 35, and 42 U.S.C.). Eligible drugs are those that treat any rare disease or condition
that affects less than 200,000 persons in the United States or “for which there is no
reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making available in the United States
a drug for such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in the United States of such
drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2012).
264. See,
e.g.,
Crazy Patents!,
FPO:
IP RES. & COMMUNITIES,
http://www.freepatentsonline.com/crazy.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (citing the
beerbrella patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,637,447 (filed Oct. 19, 2001), as an example of a
“crazy” patent having minimal utility and no commercially viability). The invention has
apparently never been commercialized even though the patent on it has long been expired.
See Patent Application Information Retrieval, USPTO.GOV, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/
PublicPair (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (select “Patent Number” under “Search for
Application: Choose type of number;” then search “6,637,447”) (confirming that the patent
expired due to nonpayment of maintenance fees).
265. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 362–63 & nn.121–
29 (2001).
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for their inventions has been identified.266 To the extent that an invention is
a commercial success because of the technological leap that it represents,
stakeholders associate this dimension with good patent quality for the same
reasons described in the preceding subsection. But it is unclear whether the
PTO, courts, and society prefer commercially successful inventions that
represent much more modest technological improvements, such as
inventions described in some standards essential patents.
Patentees highly value patents on commercially successful inventions
regardless of the magnitude of their contributions to society. All patent
claims have value by virtue of the legal rights that attach to them, and that
value can be exploited in various ways. But patents on inventions that
create or enhance consumer demand or provide a supply-side benefit, such
as reducing manufacturing costs, are that much more valuable to their
owners and therefore likely to be associated with good patent quality
because others will likely want to practice those inventions. Patentees can
turn that demand into dollars by licensing or selling the patents, using them
offensively to limit competition, or using them defensively to buy
operational freedom.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The foregoing sections operationalize the concept of patent quality by
framing it in terms of dimensions valued by stakeholders. This Part
summarizes the implications of that work. Broadly, it demonstrates that the
meaning of patent quality is far richer than most in the patent community
previously have recognized.
Going forward, commentators and
policymakers are urged to be more thoughtful—as well as transparent—
about their definitional choices.
More specifically, this Article describes a fundamentally different
approach to patent quality’s meaning that is essentially the inverse of the
conventional way of thinking about the concept. This new approach puts
“first things first” and asks what it means for a patent to be good quality
without regard to the existing standards of patentability. Describing this
new approach is the first step toward constructing a metric for patent
quality that ultimately can be used to determine the extent of the so-called
quality crisis, evaluate the success or failure of quality reforms, and think
strategically about ways to improve quality.
A. Inverting the Conventional Approach
This Article concludes that a comprehensive definition of patent quality
takes into account five dimensions of patents and the inventions they
describe. Recall the basic formula for total patent quality (TQ) described in
Part III.B:
TQ = (M1)(D1) + (M2)(D2) . . . .
266. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (awarding U.S. patents to those who are first to publicly
disclose their inventions).
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Incorporating the five quality dimensions into the basic formula results in
the following:
TQ = (MV)(V) + (MC)(C) + (MF)(F) + (MSU)(SU) + (MCS)(CS)

where V refers to a patent’s probable validity, C refers to the patent’s
clarity, F refers to the patent’s faithfulness to its underlying invention, SU
refers to the invention’s social utility, and CS refers to the invention’s
commercial success. The multiplier reflecting each dimension’s relative
importance is indicated by a unique variable M.
This understanding of the meaning of patent quality is a result of a
definitional approach that is essentially the inverse of how many in the
patent community define patent quality, which is solely in terms of
conformance with legal standards. A fundamental problem with the
conventional approach is that it relies on circular reasoning: it concludes
that a good patent is one that is legally valid because a legally valid patent
is good quality. It does not consider the question of whether the legal
standards of patentability are—or even can be—themselves calibrated and
applied to reflect good patent quality in the first place.
As described in Part III.A, commercial product specifications can be
analogized to the legal standards of patentability in that both dictate
acceptable design parameters. As the business sector discovered some
decades ago, a quality judgment based solely on conformance to
specifications will not always be accurate. A product can perfectly conform
to specs, yet it may still be bad quality if the specifications are poorly
designed.267 For this reason, firms have invested heavily in calibrating their
products’ specifications to better achieve the desired quality outcomes.268
It is time for the way the patent community thinks about the relationship
between patent quality and legal standards to similarly evolve. A definition
of patent quality that is focused only on compliance with legal standards is
limited and potentially irrelevant because it relies on the assumption that
those standards are calibrated and being applied to reflect good patent
quality. More than a few members of the patent community doubt that they
are. Some have argued, for example, that the definiteness standard is not
set where it should be,269 while others contend that the obviousness
standard is inconsistently applied.270 That these are problems in the patent
system is well known. That they are, fundamentally, patent quality
problems is not yet fully appreciated.
267. See Forker, supra note 85, at 73 (explaining Taguchi’s insight that if an original
product design does not account for environmental, manufacturing, and consumer usage
stresses, the finished product may not perform well or reliably).
268. See, e.g., FRANK R. KARDES ET AL., CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 12 (2011) (explaining that
Proctor & Gamble spends millions to determine consumer needs and design products that
respond to them).
269. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 94–100 (2011) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s
“insolubly ambiguous” standard for definiteness and urging its adoption of a more stringent
standard in order to improve notice to the public).
270. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
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The approach followed here puts “first things first” and asks what it
means for a patent to be good quality without regard to the substance of the
validity standards. This allows for a deeper inquiry into the definition that
is not artificially bounded by those standards. It also has the effect of
redirecting the policy focus from a narrow one of increasing the number of
probably valid patents to the more relevant one of increasing the number of
good-quality patents.
For Congress, the PTO, and others interested in increasing U.S. patent
quality, following this new approach will mean developing and
implementing policy proposals in addition to those intended to increase a
patent’s probability of being held valid if challenged. Proposals that
increase patents’ probability of validity include giving patent applicants the
option of “gold-plating” their patents by subjecting their applications to
rigorous examination.271 Applications that survive this heightened review
process would be accorded a strong presumption of validity, meaning that
courts would not be allowed to second-guess decisions based on prior art
reviewed by the examiner or to consider new prior art that is redundant.272
Implementing this proposal would have the effect of increasing
performance along the probable validity dimension since patents that carry
a greater presumption of validity—by definition—are more likely to be held
valid if challenged. But a validity-focused proposal is not alone sufficient
to increase patent quality. After all, patent quality that is defined solely in
terms of probable validity could be maximized simply by adopting a rule
that a patent’s validity can never be challenged. Few, however, likely
would agree that adopting such a rule would improve the quality of U.S.
patents.
Efforts to increase patent quality should therefore contemplate
maximizing patent performance along the other four quality dimensions.
An obvious way to do so is by amending the standards of patentability. For
instance, Congress might change the statutory language describing the
definiteness standard to require greater clarity than is currently required.273
But it may be more efficient to increase patent performance along the
clarity dimension through the manipulation of other policy levers.
Alternative policy levers include, for example, requiring PTO examiners to
record how the boundaries of patented property are refined during the
process of examination,274 and requiring patent applicants to use
standardized claim templates, provide glossaries of terms, and designate
271. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 46, at 61–62.
272. Id. at 62. Another policy proposal that increases patents’ probability of validity is
giving deference to tribunals’ prior validity decisions. According to this proposal, if a claim
is found valid in the context of litigation or an adversarial post-grant agency proceeding,
tribunals who later find themselves in the position of assessing the validity of the same claim
should place a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of validity. See id. at 63–65.
273. For example, the current statutory requirement that patent claims “particularly
point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor
regards as the invention,” 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012), might be amended to require patent
claims to “unambiguously” point out and claim the invention.
274. See Petherbridge, supra note 27, at 189.
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default dictionaries in their applications.275 This Article takes no position
on the best way to optimize performance along the various quality
dimensions. The point, rather, is that there are often ways to do so beyond
recommending that Congress change the text of the standards or urging the
courts to adopt a new interpretation of that text.
B.

Pursuing Quality Strategically

The new definitional approach described here not only promotes
informed policymaking, but it also promotes strategic policymaking. To
maximize the effectiveness of any plans to improve patent quality,
policymakers should follow the lead of business and adopt a strategic
approach to quality improvement efforts. Depending on the circumstances,
it may not be possible, necessary, or efficient to attempt to measure or
optimize performance along every dimension. When this is the case, the
rational reform strategy is to focus on improving performance along those
quality dimensions that will result in the largest quality gains at the least
cost.
Returning to the variables identified in Part III.B, one of the most
efficient ways to maximize the impact of quality-improvement efforts is to
focus on improving performance along dimensions having the largest
multipliers. A second way is to focus on improving performance along
dimensions that are positive reinforcers of other dimensions—preferably
those having the largest multipliers.276 Conversely, an inefficient quality
strategy is to focus on improving performance along dimensions having the
smallest multipliers or that negatively reinforce other dimensions—
especially those having large multipliers. To illustrate with a simple
example, if the multiplier for the clarity dimension is significantly greater
than the multiplier for the commercial success dimension, the efficient
policy plan should focus on increasing the clarity of patents rather than
ensuring the commercial success of the inventions they describe. And if
improvement along the clarity dimension positively reinforces improvement
along the commercial success dimension, there is even more reason to
pursue this plan. Stated in management theory terms, efforts to improve
patent quality as a whole should favor policies focused on improvement in
the quality niche occupied by the clarity dimension over the quality niche
occupied by the social utility dimension.
Admittedly, this analysis cannot be conducted without a clear
understanding of the costs associated with pursuing quality along each
dimension. But it is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to quantify
those costs. The aim here is to describe a systematic approach to the
meaning of patent quality and to demonstrate that patent quality can and
should be a strategic pursuit. It does not argue for or against any particular
275. Request for Comments on Preparation of Patent Applications, 78 Fed. Reg. 2960
(Jan. 15, 2013).
276. Garvin recognized the strategic importance of understanding these relationships with
respect to product quality. Garvin, supra note 73, at 104 (explaining that “it is precisely this
interplay” between quality dimensions that “makes strategic quality management possible”).
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policy agenda. Going forward, however, it would be worthwhile to study
the marginal costs and benefits of performing well along each quality
dimension for the purpose of developing efficient strategies to increase
overall patent quality.
CONCLUSION
This Article represents the first scholarly attempt to deconstruct the
meaning of patent quality. It does so by using a methodology applied in the
business literature of quality management. The implications of this work
include a new appreciation for the multidimensional nature of the concept, a
fundamental reorientation of policymaking efforts to focus on patent quality
as defined by quality dimensions rather than validity standards, and a
proposed formula for assessing patent quality that can be used to develop a
strategic quality plan. Although several aspects of the analysis merit further
study, including the costs of pursuing quality along each dimension, this
Article lays the groundwork for that research, and in so doing, brings
needed clarity and direction to the patent quality agenda.

